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INCOMPLETE LAW
KATHARINA PISTOR* AND CHENGGANG XU**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article develops a framework for analyzing the rela-
tion between basic features of statutory and case law and the
design and functioning of institutions that enforce this law.
The basic premise is that law is inherently incomplete and that
this has important implications for law enforcement. In partic-
ular, when law is incomplete, special emphasis needs to be
placed on the allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement
powers (LMLEP) to different institutions such as legislatures,
courts, or regulators, in order to attain optimal levels of law
enforcement.1 Using the development of the legal framework
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1. By "optimal" levels we do not mean "perfect" law enforcement. Every
legal system will need to strike a balance between the danger of over-deter-
rence on the one hand and the danger of under-deterrence on the other.
Law enforcement reaches optimal levels when the balance is struck in a way
that ensures that actions that create great harm will be prevented or de-
terred, while actions that create more benefits than harm will be allowed to
take place.
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governing financial markets as an example to illustrate the
conceptual framework, this Article examines how different le-
gal systems have responded to the problem of incomplete law
by reallocating lawmaking and law enforcement powers from
courts to regulators. Most examples are drawn from the U.K.,
which has spearheaded financial market development since
the mid-19th century. A comparative analysis of the U.S. and
German experiences is also presented.
This Article regards a law as complete if a law enacted to-
day unambiguously stipulates for all future contingencies; oth-
erwise a law is incomplete. 2 A law may be incomplete if it at-
tempts to specify comprehensively actions that shall be cov-
ered but fails to include some which could result in similar
harmful outcome. Alternatively, law may be incomplete be-
cause it uses open-ended, vague wording, as a result of which
the boundaries of the law are not clearly delineated.3
Incomplete law may be a function of bad drafting, but it is
not limited to that. While failure to include all relevant issues
that are known at the time a law is drafted or a court verdict is
rendered may be the result of oversight, there are a number of
other causes for incomplete law, including environmental fac-
tors and deliberate design.
Some areas of the law may be more incomplete than
others. Environmental factors influence the relative incom-
pleteness of law. Areas that are affected by a high pace of so-
2. The "incomplete law" problem has frequently been mentioned in
academia without, however, developing a broader framework to explain the
processes and institutions of lawmaking and law enforcement. Close to this
Article's use of the term "incomplete law" is William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 875, 879 (1975). In this Article, which addresses the puzzle ofjudicial
independence, the authors note that "... the limits of human foresight, the
ambiguities of language, and the high cost of legislative deliberation com-
bine to assure that most legislation will be enacted in a seriously incomplete
form, with many areas of uncertainty left to be resolved by the courts." Id. at
879 (emphasis added). The theory presented in this Article goes a step fur-
ther in developing a general analytical framework of the inherently incom-
plete nature of the law. In particular, this theory suggests that not only
courts, but also other agents, such as regulators, may be charged with law-
making and law enforcement and attempts to identify the optimal allocation
of lawmaking and law enforcement rights.
3. For a differentiation of these types of incomplete law from the more
common categorization used in the legal literature of "rules" and "stan-
dards," see infra discussion in note 27.
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cioeconomic and/or technological change, for example, tend
to be more incomplete than areas unaffected by exogenous
change. The reason is that such change constantly challenges
legal solutions designed to solve "old" problems and thus re-
quires frequent adaptations of the law if it is to remain effec-
tive. Law may also be incomplete by design. Lawmakers may
decide to design laws to be more or less complete. They may
do so by enumerating only a few actions that the law will cover,
or by drafting highly ambiguous, open-ended provisions.
Lawmakers choose the level and type of incompleteness
for various reasons. The choice may be determined by percep-
tions of existing law enforcement institutions and their effec-
tiveness. Knowing that courts will step in and fill the gaps left
by laws may also lead lawmakers to draft broad, open-ended
provisions rather than detailed ones. Conversely, if lawmaking
powers are withheld from courts, or if courts are perceived to
be incapable of exercising these powers in a meaningful fash-
ion, lawmakers may want to record their intentions in a more
precise manner in order to minimize courts' discretion. In ad-
dition, lawmakers may prefer incomplete over relatively com-
plete law as a means to avoid difficult policy choices and shift
responsibility for possible backlashes to the law enforcers. 4 Fi-
nally, lawmakers may be ill-equipped or lack the necessary re-
sources to write comparatively complete law. This Article does
not address the reasons why lawmakers choose to make more
or less complete law but makes the factual assumption that law
is incomplete as a given.
When law is incomplete it cannot be applied to cases with-
out clarifying the meaning of the law. This power to interpret
existing law, to adapt it to changing circumstances, and to ex-
tend its application to new cases is herein referred to as the
"residual lawmaking power."5 Residual lawmaking powers may
4. For a similar argument, see Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the
Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?,
13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 350 (1993). See also Joseph A. Grundfest &
A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambigu-
ity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (2002),
which suggests that lawmakers may decide to leave a law highly ambiguous,
or incomplete, because that is the only compromise they can reach.
5. As discussed below, these terms are borrowed from the literature on
incompleteness of contracts, which has inspired this Article. See discussion
infra Part III.A.
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be reserved by the legislature. They may also be vested with
courts or with regulators (including self- and state regulators).
This Article explores the conditions under which allocating
residual lawmaking powers to legislatures, courts, or regulators
is optimal.
In addition to lawmaking powers, law enforcement pow-
ers must be allocated. Even the best-designed law is useless
without compliance, whether voluntary or coercive. A substan-
tial literature has developed that explores the conditions for
efficient law enforcement. At the core of this literature is the
deterrence function of punishment as argued by Bentham, 6
modeled by Becker,7 and further developed by Stigler." Polin-
sky and Shavell refined the model and gave a recent survey of
the literature; their analysis is taken as a benchmark. 9 This
literature explores the optimal design of laws and punishment
to achieve efficient deterrence. This literature, however, as-
sumes implicitly that law is complete, i.e., that law is unam-
biguously stated for all individuals and law enforcers in an
economy and that it covers all potential harmful actions.' 0
6. In the third chapter of his The Rationale of Punishment, entitled "Of
the Ends of Punishment," Jeremy Bentham writes about the deterrence ef-
fect of punishment:
Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a
man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act,
he is acted upon in such a manner as tends, with a certain force, to
withdraw him, as it were, from the commission of that act. If the
apparent magnitude, or rather value of that pain be greater than
the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he ex-
pects to be the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely pre-
vented from performing it. The mischief which would have ensued
from the act, if performed, will also by that means be prevented.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19-20 (1830).
7. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 176 (1968).
8. See GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Optimal Enforcement of Laws, 78J. POL. ECON.
526, 526-29 (1970).
9. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38J. ECON. LITERATURE 45 (2000).
10. Note, however, that some authors have addressed the fact that law is
often vague. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
319-20 (3d ed. 2000). Their major interest is "how people adjust their pre-
caution in response to legal uncertainty." Id. at 319. By contrast, this Article
focuses on how lawmakers and law enforcers can reduce the scope of uncer-
tainty that results from incomplete law in order to optimize law enforcement
from a social welfare perspective.
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Under this assumption, it is possible to design law in such a
way that optimal deterrence will achieve the most desirable
outcome. Consistent with this assumption, enforcement by
courts is at the center of the analysis.
If, however, law is incomplete as this Article argues, the
challenge for law enforcement is more complex than the de-
sign of optimal punishment. It requires the design of appro-
priate institutional mechanisms to address the problem of
suboptimal enforcement from a social welfare perspective. In
particular, when the expected damages from harmful actions
may be large, courts alone may not be sufficient to ensure opti-
mal law enforcement. This follows from the nature of law en-
forcement by courts. Courts are designed to be reactive law
enforcers. They become active only when another party-be it
state or private-initiates legal proceedings. The reason that
courts do not initiate investigations themselves is that this
would undermine their neutrality and impartiality. At least in
countries that are committed to the rule of law, these are core
values that have shaped the design and the success of courts as
reactive law enforcers.' 1 By contrast, regulators enforce law-
not exclusively, but primarily-proactively. They monitor be-
havior, launch investigations, and enjoin or punish actions on
their own initiative. This Article suggests that proactive law en-
forcement by regulators has emerged largely in response to
the problem of incomplete law in areas where substantial neg-
ative externalities rendered reactive law enforcement ineffi-
cient.
To highlight the central issues associated with incomplete
law, this Article downplays incentive problems different
lawmakers and law enforcers may face, including problems of
regulatory capture or corruption. While recognizing that
these issues are of great importance, this Article nonetheless
11. As Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast show,
the emergence of neutral dispute resolvers has played a crucial role in the
economic development of Europe since the late Middle Ages. See Paul R.
Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 19-20
(1990). Using a game theory model, they show the positive impact of courts
acting as neutral arbiters. See id. at 6-9. Relaxing this assumption and assum-
ing that courts violate their impartiality, there are negative implications for
solving the information problem that traders face when they transact with
parties with whom they do not maintain a long-term relationship.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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suggests that analytically they are of secondary importance to
the problem of incomplete law. Solving the problem of regu-
latory capture by, for example, abolishing regulators will not
address the problems which gave rise to the establishment of
regulators in the first place. 12 Conversely, arguing that the ex-
istence of regulators can be attributed to their greater efficacy
in collecting evidence when compared to courts1 3 does not ex-
plain the absence of regulators in many areas of law where the
collection of information is very costly, or the presence of reg-
ulators in areas of the law where collecting information may
not be particularly costly.
This Article does not suggest that regulators are desirable
for all areas of the law even when law is highly incomplete. In
a companion paper, the optimal allocation of lawmaking and
law enforcement rights with regards to fiduciary duties direc-
tors owe to shareholders is analyzed,1 4 and the argument is
made that although fiduciary duty is an example of a highly
incomplete law, allocating LMLEP to courts is optimal. The
reason why is that the expected harm is typically limited to the
shareholders of a particular company. Moreover, it would be
extremely difficult to standardize the type of actions that
might result in harm in light of the diverse actions that direc-
tors may take and that may or may not result in harmful out-
comes. Imposing a regulator not only would be costly but also
would likely result in excessive oversight of decision-making
processes in private sector companies.
This theory is not limited to corporate law or financial
market regulations. To the contrary, its basic principles-the
need to consider the allocation of lawmaking and law enforce-
ment powers to different agents that perform different func-
12. We propose that problems such as corruption and regulatory capture
arise at least in part because law is incomplete, as incompleteness by defini-
tion enhances the discretion of law enforcers and reduces the possibility of
effectively monitoring their law abidance. Further analysis of the relation-
ship between incomplete law and corruption will be left to future research.
13. Edward Glaeser et al., Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q.J. ECON. 853,
854-55 (2001). While the Article focuses on transition economies, it poten-
tially has much wider applicability.
14. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duties in Transitional
Civil Law Jurisdiction: Lessons from the Incompleteness of Law Theory, in GLOBAL
MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A
NEW ERA OF CROSS-BoRDER DEALS 77 (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2003).
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tions-equally apply to environmental, safety, food and drug
regulation, and the like. For illustrative purposes, however,
analysis in this Article is limited to financial markets.
The incomplete law framework is inspired by the incom-
plete contract theory, which was spearheaded by Oliver Hart
and others in the literature of economics.' 5 A reception of
this theory into legal analysis is only beginning, but as sug-
gested by others, 16 it bears much promise. The starting point
of this theory is that not only contracts but law is inherently
incomplete-indeed that the incompleteness problem is more
profound for law than for contracts.' 7
A companion theoretical Article'8 develops a model to ex-
plore the impact of incomplete law on different law enforce-
ment mechanisms. The model demonstrates that under in-
complete law the law enforcement by courts (along the lines of
the Becker-Stigler model) may result in deterrence failure.
The Article then suggests that introducing a different type of
law enforcement mechanism, namely proactive law enforce-
ment by a regulator, may mitigate the deterrence failure prob-
15. For references, see infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
16. See KAREN EGGLESTON ET AL., SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXITY IN CON-
TRACTs (ohn. M. Olin Law & Economics (2d Series), Working Paper No.
93, 2000), available at http://www.Iaw.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html,
for an excellent introduction to this newly developing field. The terminol-
ogy of "incomplete contracts" has been used in the legal literature for quite
a while. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92 n.30 (1989). Scholars
treat incompleteness of contract problems primarily as a design issue. Con-
tracts are incomplete because it is too costly to write complete contracts, id.
at 92-93, or because there are strategic reasons for drafters to believe that
they might benefit from relatively incomplete contracts, id. at 94. By con-
trast, the incomplete contract literature in economics (to be discussed in
greater detail in Part III.A, infra), argues that non-verifiabilit, is at the heart
of the incompleteness problem, and therefore it is impossible to design a
complete contract. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete
Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115, 134-35 (1999).
17. We would even suggest that the fact that law is incomplete influences
the strategies that are available for dealing with the problem of incomplete
contracts.
18. See CHENGGANG Xu & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAw ENFORCEMENT UNDER
INCOMPLETE LAw: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL MARKET REGULA-
TION (London School of Economics and Political Science, Suntory and
Toyota Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, Working Paper No.
TE/02/332, 2002, available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/te/te442.pdf)
[hereinafter Xu & PISTOR, LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER INCOMPLETE LAw].
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lem. This Article, by contrast, addresses the broader concep-
tual issue of incomplete law and presents more detailed empir-
ical evidence on the evolution of different types of law
enforcement mechanisms in financial market development.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II develops the
analytical framework of incomplete law and the proper alloca-
tion of lawmaking and law enforcement powers that is implied
by incomplete law. Part III places this theory within existing
literatures in law and economics, including the literature on
the indeterminacy of law, the incompleteness of contracts
literature, and the literatures on law enforcement and regula-
tion. Part IV applies this framework to the development of
financial market regulation in England since the mid-19th
century. Part V extends this analysis to other countries and
summarizes major developments in the regulation of financial
markets in the U.S. (including the recent introduction of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and Germany. Part VI draws conclusions
about the need for and the optimal level of regulation and
proposes areas for future research.
II. INCOMPLETE LAW: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This section develops the incomplete law concept, ex-
plains why law is inherently incomplete, and argues that given
incomplete law, the allocation of residual lawmaking and law
enforcement powers (LMLEP) to different agents affects law
enforcement. It then compares the tradeoffs of allocating
LMLEP to legislatures, courts, and regulators.
A. Why Law is Incomplete
As suggested above, this Article considers a law as com-
plete if all relevant applications of the law are unambiguously
stipulated in the law and the law can be enforced literally pro-
vided that evidence is established. This requires that the law is
self-explanatory, i.e., that every addressee agrees to the mean-
ing of the law and, by implication, that there is no need for
interpreting the law. Otherwise, a law is incomplete, that is,
some of the relevant issues are not stipulated in the law or they
remain ambiguous. An incomplete law cannot be enforced lit-
erally even when evidence is established.
The basic premise is that law is intrinsically incomplete.
In a state governed by the rule of law, law is designed to serve a
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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large number of addressees for long periods of time and to
cover a great variance of cases. Generality of law means that
law is designed to last, to apply to large numbers of addressees
for long periods of time. The concept is closely linked to the
notion that everyone is equal before the law. A general law is
designed to apply equally all conditions described in the law,
irrespective of the class, social status, or other attributes of in-
dividuals subject to the law. As such, general law cannot be
easily used as a tool for oppressing individual opponents or
inflicting arbitrary punishments. The flip side of the general-
ity of law is that it makes it impossible to design complete law,
which could affect the outcome for a variety of cases that may
arise in the future.
Absent the limitations of the generality of law constraint,
law could be designed to be more complete. A law could be
designed to apply to a specific case and to last only for a short
period of time. Such a law would closely resemble a specific
contract between the state and a private lawparty rather than a
social contract with multiple addressees. This Article there-
fore terms it a "single-case-law." Each single-case-law can be
more complete for the particular issue it addresses and for the
limited time period it covers. Still, this approach has signifi-
cant limitations. Only the parties to this particular law benefit
from it, and only for the time period for which the single-case-
law was designed. Those not a party to the single-case-law
might bargain for similar arrangements, but without certainty
as to the outcome of their negotiations. Similarly, even the
parties to the original law need to renegotiate its terms after it
expires. Put differently, single-case-laws regulate specific af-
fairs, but do not establish positive externalities in the form of
general rules that might help others to structure their rela-
tions or serve as guidance for future disputes. They create pri-
vate, but not social, benefits. 19 They are also more susceptible
to interest group pressure. Finally, because a special law must
be passed for each particular case and for every future change,
single-case-law suffers from high transaction costs.
Examples of single-case-law in recent Western legal his-
tory include the incorporation of companies in the 19th cen-
19. Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997), developed
this argument for the case of litigation.
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tury by special approval (concession) granted by state bureau-
cracy 20 or by special bill passed by the legislature. 2 1 The in-
creasing number of incorporation bills that legislatures in the
U.S. had to enact during the period of industrialization, as
well as mounting corruption allegations surrounding the
adoption of these bills, resulted in the adoption of general in-
corporation acts in many states since the 1830s 22 and in Dela-
ware in 1871.23 As the number of single-case-laws did not sub-
side, precisely because they gave companies advantages they
could not obtain under general law, Delaware amended its
constitution in 1897 to prohibit incorporation other than
under the general law.24 Since then, changes in the law affect
all companies incorporated in Delaware, and it is not in the
discretion of the legislature to alter the law only for a specific
company.25
The generality of law may be disputed with regard to case
law. In common law countries where courts have extensive
original and residual lawmaking authority, the law is devel-
oped on the basis of specific cases brought before the courts.
Only those parts of the decision that are supported by the facts
are binding on other courts, as "holding" or ratio decidende.
Other parts of the decision are considered dicta and non-bind-
ing. 26 Still, the holdings have legal force beyond the case at
hand and, until overruled, are binding on all cases in lower
courts that are alike. Thus, case law also exhibits the key fea-
tures of generality and equality before the law.
20. JAMES WILLARD HURS'r, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORA-
TION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (1970).
21. See RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 1
(1937).
22. Id. at 2-4.
23. SeeAct of Mar. 21, 1871, ch. 152, 1871 Del. Laws 229 (allowing incor-
poration for "drying, canning, manufacturing and preparing of fruits and
other products of the State for sale;" Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege
to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst's Study of Corporations, 49 Am.
U. L. REv. 81, 105 & n.95 (1999) (listing first general incorporation statutes
of Delaware and other states). In 1875, Delaware amended its Constitution
to broaden the legislature's authority to enact general incorporation statutes
and passed a general incorporation statute under this amendment. See
LARCOM, supra note 21, at 4.
24. See LARCOM, supra note 21, at 7.
25. Id.
26. JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS: CASES AND MATERIALS 80 (1996).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
(Vol. 35:931
INCOMPLETE LAW
Law can be incomplete for different reasons. It may be
incomplete because it broadly circumscribes outcomes without
identifying particular actions, or enumerates only a few actions
(Type I incomplete law). Alternatively, law may be incomplete
because it specifies the actions that shall be prevented but fails
to capture all relevant actions (Type II incomplete law).27
An example of Type I incomplete law is tort law. General
tort principles typically stipulate that damage to property, life,
and liberty gives rise to a liability claim against the person re-
sponsible. 28 Note that no single action is defined, only the
broad outcome of damages to life, liberty, and property. Re-
quiing intent or negligence or imposing strict liability can fur-
ther circumscribe the scope of liability, but this still leaves
open the question of what form actions might take that will
trigger liability under the law.
A good example of Type II incomplete law is criminal stat-
utes. They usually contain a number of provisions aimed at
protecting property rights, but each designed to cover a partic-
ular action, such as theft, embezzlement, damage to property,
and the like.2 9 Closer inspection of these provisions reveals
that the law has not captured all possible actions that could
violate property rights. Rather, a conscious choice was made
27. In legal literature, some properties of incomplete laws of the first
type are discussed as "norms," and some properties of incomplete laws of the
second type as "rules." See generally Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of
Rules, in THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGAT[ION 502, 508-14 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (discussing "rules" and "stan-
dards"). For an analysis of the tradeoffs of norms and rules, see Louis
Kaplow, Rules verses Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1993).
Building on this literature, some authors have proposed to use primarily
"bright-line rules" when legislating in emerging markets and developing
countries. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Hay et al., Toward a Theory of Legal Rform,
40 EUR. ECON. REv. 559, 566 (1996) (arguing that because courts in these
countries tend to be weak, there should be fairly little discretion left for law
enforcers). The underlying assumption is that the lawmaker has a choice to
write more or less complete law. Id. While this is true to some extent, our
point is that no law can be written so as to eliminate discretion completely,
because law is inherently incomplete. The novelty of our theory is its sugges-
tion that the incompleteness of law necessitates an allocation of residual law-
making and law enforcement powers to different agents. Our theory also
proposes tradeoffs to determine the optimal allocation of lawmaking and
law enforcement powers.
28. See, e.g., 74 Am. JuR. 2D Torts§ 1 (2001).
29. See, e.g., infra note 31.
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to write highly specific law even if this inevitably meant that
actions resulting in similar harm would not be covered. This
choice results from the commitment to the nulla poena sine lege
(no punishment without law) principle, which follows directly
from the rule of law principle. 30
To illustrate the distinction between Type I and Type II
incomplete law and its impact on law enforcement, consider
the following case. Most legal systems prohibit theft. Theft is
frequently defined as the appropriation of an asset owned by
another person by breaching his or her possession. 31 When
electricity was invented and some people simply hooked their
households to electricity lines themselves instead of connect-
ing officially and paying their bills, the question arose whether
this constituted a theft. For the German Supreme Court
(Reichsgericht), which had to decide this issue in the late 19th
century, the key question was whether electricity was an "asset"
(eine Sache) as defined by law. 32 It acquitted, because it denied
the asset quality of electricity and argued that the extension of
the existing theft provision would amount to lawmaking by
analogy, which would be in violation of the nulla poena sine lege
principle.3 3 The legislative response was to insert a new provi-
sion in the code that dealt specifically with appropriating en-
ergy. 34
When confronted with similar cases, U.S. courts argued
that the key issue was not the asset quality, but whether a thing
can be appropriated. This allowed them to apply existing theft
provisions even in cases where the asset quality of the item that
30. SeeJOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITV OF Law 213-14 (1979).
31. See, for example, the Penal Code of New York State, which defines
larceny or theft as follows: "A person steals property and commits larceny
when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same
to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds
such property from an owner thereof." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (Consol.
2000). Similarly, see § 242 of the German Penal Code, which states that
"whoever deprives another person of an asset with the intent of appropriat-
ing that asset either to himself or to a third person" commits a theft. § 242
Nr. I STRAEGESETZBUCH [StGB].
32. SeeRGStr 29, 111 (111); RGStr 32, 165 (166).
33. See RGStr 29, 111 (111); RGStr 32, 165 (166).
34. See § 248c StGB, first enacted in April 1900; see also ADOLF SCH6NKE &
HORST SCHRODER, STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR [PENAL CODE ANNOTATED]
910 (9th ed. 1959) (noting the law's introduction in 1900).
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was the object of the alleged theft was disputed. 35 In other
words, they interpreted the law to be broader and more am-
biguous at the borders than their German counterparts had.
Nevertheless, the matter remained sufficiently unsettled to
bring a case to the New York Supreme Court as late as 1978.36
Meanwhile, New York has expanded the definition of property
in its Penal Code to include "any article, substance or thing of
value, including any gas, steam, water or electricity. ' -3 7 While
this broad definition facilitates law enforcement, courts will
still need to develop criteria to exclude from this provision
cases which do not meet the threshold implied in a theft accu-
sation. More recently, English courts were confronted with
the question of whether the case law on abstracting electricity
could be expanded to convict persons who had fraudulently
used telephone lines without paying. This was denied on the
grounds that the use of analogy was inappropriate. 38 Obvi-
ously, if England had followed the New York example, the
courts could have convicted the accused. Absent such a broad
definition, however, the court felt restrained by the nulla poena
sine lege principle.
The theft problem demonstrates that technological
change may render previously fairly complete law incomplete.
Prior to the invention of electricity or telecommunications,
the concept of theft had been well defined and was fairly com-
plete. But electricity and telephone lines were not assets or
property in the traditional sense. Lawmakers and law enforc-
ers had to decide whether the unauthorized use of electricity
or telephone lines deserved the same level of punishment.
The cases also reveal that courts exercise only limited residual
lawmaking powers in the area of criminal law. The result has
frequently been acquittal, even though the identified actions
35. See, e.g., People v. Menagas, 11 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Ill. 1937).
36. See People v. McLaughlin, 402 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. 1978). For a sum-
mary of U.S. and English case law in this matter, see id. at 139-40. In the
words of the Supreme Court of Illinois when dealing with this matter in
1937, "[t]he true tests of what is a proper subject of larceny seems to be not
whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of
appropriation by another than the owner." Menagas, II N.E.2d at 407.
37. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155(1) (Consol. 2000).
38. See Reg. v. Nadig, 14 Crim. App. R. (S.) 49-50 (1993). The appellate
court held that "it was inappropriate to rely on the analogy of cases of fraud-
ulently abstracting electricity" in this particular case. Id. at 49-50, 52.
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were widely regarded as wrongful.3 9 This is a clear example of
deliberate under-enforcement of the law. It is the price legal
systems pay for adhering to principles, such as nulla poena sine
lege, that limit the state's power to punish unless the action has
been clearly stipulated as a crime before it occurred. More
generally, any attempt to write a highly complete law that spec-
ifies the type of action to be sanctioned is bound to result in
under-enforcement, because actions the lawmaker did not
foresee ex ante, but which may result in similar harmful out-
comes, are bound to occur.
B. Incompleteness of Law Versus Imperfectness of Evidence
The above example of electricity theft also demonstrates
that it is important to distinguish the difficulty of establishing
evidence from incomplete law. In the above cases, the fact
that the accused had appropriated energy by hooking their
households to existing electricity lines without a contract and
without paying bills was undisputed. The only question was
whether these actions constituted a theft.40
The type of evidence needed to convict a person or to
hold her liable under the law is determined by the law that
shall be applied.41 Before collecting evidence it is therefore
important to establish whether the action-assuming all rele-
vant evidence can be established-falls within the scope of the
law. If that is clearly not the case, there is no need to tackle
the evidence question. Only if the law can be interpreted to
cover the relevant actions does the question of evidence
arise. 42
To give an example, suppose an anti-corruption law states
that extending gifts to government officials is considered a
bribe if the amount exceeds U.S. $500 per annum. There are
allegations that A has presented a gift of U.S. $50 to the offi-
cial in charge of building permits. Since the law clearly estab-
39. See, e.g., supra notes 32-33, 38, and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
41. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5162, at 14-15 (1978).
42. An effort to collect evidence will be wasted if the action does not fall
within the scope of the law because the action will not survive the pleading
stage of litigation. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6); 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 118
(1996).
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lishes a higher threshold than the alleged conduct meets, the
action does not fall within the scope of the law. Thus there is
no need to establish evidence. Note, however, that when the
law is rather vague, i.e., when dealing with Type I incomplete
law, it may be necessary to collect evidence in order to deter-
mine whether or not the law is applicable to a particular case.
If, for example, the anti-corruption law states that a gift of
"substantial" value may be considered a bribe, it may be rele-
vant to collect evidence to show why a particular gift would be
considered "substantial." Still, even this question is different
from the question of whether A has actually given the official a
gift of U.S. $50.
C. Incompleteness of Law Versus Uncertainties of Punishment
The concept of incomplete law is related to the concept
of vagueness or indeterminacy of the law. In their economic
analysis of "vague standards" as opposed to "bright line rules,"
Cooter and Ulen suggest that "in reality ... legal commands
are often vague and unpredictable. '43 They suggest that if law
is vague, courts may err in setting the correct standard for an
individual injurer, just as individual injurers may err in pre-
dicting the standard that courts will apply to them.44 As a re-
sult, injurers will take additional precaution to avoid punish-
ment, because the potential damage from excessive punish-
ment harms them more than the cost of over-precaution to
avoid punishment. 45
The incomplete law analysis differs from this framework
in two important respects. First, the incomplete law analysis
suggests that law may just as well result in under-enforcement
as in over-enforcement. Ex ante it is difficult to predict which
outcome is more likely. This follows from the notion that in-
complete law covers both Type and I and Type II incomplete
law, whereas the vagueness theory covers only Type II. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the focus is less on the responsive-
ness of the potential injurer to legal uncertainty and more on
the design of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions in
areas where errors in law enforcement, including under- and
over-enforcement, are associated with great harm. Whereas
43. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 319.
44. Id. at 319-20.
45. Id.
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Cooter and Ulen suggest that courts may reduce the error
problem on a case-by-case basis, 46 this Article proposes that,
under certain circumstances, it may be more efficient to reallo-
cate lawmaking and law enforcement powers away from courts
and to a different agent.
D. Allocating LMLE Powers
Every legal system allocates the power to make and en-
force laws to different agents. The most common lawmaking
agents in democratic systems are legislatures and, at least in
common law countries, courts; the most important law en-
forcement agents are courts. These agents may be said to ex-
ercise original lawmaking and law enforcement powers. When
law is incomplete, allocating original LMLEP alone is insuffi-
cient for achieving efficient levels of deterrence. Because a
given law cannot resolve all future cases, the power to inter-
pret and develop existing law and to decide how to deal with
new cases needs to be allocated. We call these powers the
residual LMLEP. These powers may be allocated to courts or to
other agents, such as regulators. 47 Different institutional con-
straints allow regulators to make and enforce laws in ways legis-
latures or courts cannot.
Each legal system faces the challenge of optimizing the
relative completeness for different areas of the law and of allo-
cating residual lawmaking powers to different agents. This Ar-
ticle does not suggest that there is a "best practice" for allocat-
ing LMLEP. However, the analytical framework allows identifi-
cation of complementarities between types and degrees of
incomplete law on the one hand, and the efficacy and costs of
different law enforcement agents on the other. It may there-
fore also serve to assess the choices made by different legal
systems.
The two major legal systems in the world, the common
law and the civil law system, allocate residual lawmaking pow-
ers quite differently.4s In the common law system, judges not
46. Id. at 322.
47. As stated in the introduction, we limit our analysis in this Article to
regulators generically defined. Future research shall address tradeoffs be-
tween state and self-regulators.
48. Scholars of comparative law typically distinguish several subfamilies
within the civil law family, namely the French, German, and Scandinavian.
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only hold extensive residual lawmaking powers; they are also
vested with original lawmaking powers, i.e., with the power to
develop new principles of law. 49 In civil law systems judges are
said to interpret, not make, law. The theft cases discussed
above evidence differences in the approach civil and common
law judges might take in handling similar cases. While the
German Supreme Court felt compelled to acquit, the English
and American courts developed new law addressing the cases
before them. 50
The line between lawmaking and law interpretation, how-
ever, is often difficult to draw. Interpretation, even if narrowly
construed, involves an element of residual lawmaking. It im-
plies that the application of a law to a particular set of facts
does not follow immediately from the wording of the statute or
case law. In one sense, civil law judges may even be said to be
less constrained than common law judges. They are not sub-
ject to the rule of precedent; that is, they are not legally
obliged to follow the rulings of superior courts. In practice,
however, lower courts will usually do so, as they risk being
overruled otherwise. Yet the absence of a formal precedent
rule still may give judges more leeway in interpreting the law.
Thus, this Article suggests that, even in civil law countries,
judges exercise residual lawmaking powers. It does, however,
concede that judges in civil law jurisdictions are more con-
strained in exercising these rights than judges in common law
jurisdictions, in part because of legal doctrine, and in part due
to other institutional constraints on judges.5 1
See, e.g., KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAw (Tony Wier trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998); RENE DAVID & JOHN E. BRIERLY,
MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (1985); MARY ANN GLENDON ET
AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (1994).
49. There is a substantial debate whether common law judges actually
"make" law or whether they "find" the law based on legal principles. See, e.g.,
Jack G. Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 563, 563-65
(1994) (rejecting the view that judges "find" law). For our purposes this
distinction is not crucial. The key point is that in common law countries it is
widely recognized that judges exercise substantial powers to make legally
binding precedents, which fill some gaps in the law. This lawmaking power
is one of their major functions.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 35.
51. For an empirical analysis of the "daringness" of judges in different
legal systems, see Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial
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The two major law enforcement agents, courts and regula-
tors, differ in the process and timing of how they exercise their
residual LMLEP. Courts are designed to function as neutral
arbiters, another essential feature of a legal system based on
the rule of law.52 They are therefore designed to be passive
and to exercise their LMLEP only after a motion has been
brought. They do not have the power to take action sua sponte
even when such an intervention might be desirable.
By contrast, regulators are designed to enforce law proac-
tively. Proactive law enforcement includes various functions,
such as controlling entry, monitoring activities, initiating inves-
tigations, enjoining actions, and initiating the administration
of sanctions against violators. Courts can carry out none of
these functions, because courts are designed to be impartial
and therefore have to remain passive until others bring ac-
tions.5 3
A simple example of a proactive law enforcer is the police.
The police monitor behavior and seek to prevent damages by
enjoining actions that are likely to cause harm. The police can
stop a car even when the driver is not speeding or violating
other rules, just because, for example, the manner of driving
suggests that there could be something wrong (sometimes
even exact observance of the rules can raise suspicions). Un-
like courts, the police cannot convict the driver under criminal
law. This remains the task of the courts. But they can stop
him, administer an alcohol test, prevent him from continuing
on his way if the test is positive, and even impose a fine. To
this end the police are vested with the power to investigate,
collect information, and enjoin actions.
This Article argues that the need for proactive law enforc-
ers such as police or regulators arises only when law is incom-
Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L. R.EV. L. & ECON. 295,
295-96 (1996).
52. Other features described above were the generality of law and equal-
ity before the law. See supra Part H.A.
53. Our theory of regulation is consistent with Jeremy Bentham's argu-
ment made in the 19th century that there was a need for "devising a course
of legislative acts adapted to prevent offenses," even though he did not refer
explicitly to the issue of incomplete law. SeeJEREMy BENTHAM, THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 358 (Richard Hildreth trans., 2d ed. 1871).
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plete.54 When law is complete, legal systems do not have to
concern themselves with seeking alternatives to courts as the
major law enforcement institutions. All they need to do is en-
sure that the level of punishment and the probability of get-
ting caught are sufficiently high. If law is incomplete, how-
ever, law enforcement agents and the optimal allocation of
LMLEP become crucial. This is because when law is incom-
plete, it cannot effectively deter. In combination with the de-
sign of courts as reactive law enforcers and predominantly ex
post lawmakers, the most likely outcome is under-enforcement
of the law. As explained above, even when evidence has been
established that the alleged actions have taken place and re-
sulted in harmful outcomes, there may be doubts as to
whether these actions fall within the scope of the relevant law.
Individuals contemplating actions may respond to the incom-
plete law problem in two ways. They may proceed on the as-
sumption that the law will not apply to them. Alternatively,
they may be overly cautious because their actions may fall
within the scope of a particular law and result in punishment.
In either case, the deterrence effect of the law is not optimal.
In the first case, the law under-deters; in the second, it over-
deters.
Courts and regulators also typically differ as to when they
exercise their LMLEP. Courts for the most part make and en-
force law ex post, that is, after harm has occurred. Ex post law
enforcement is closely related to the function of courts as reac-
tive law enforcers. Because courts have to wait for others to
bring a motion, they are typically called upon only at times
when the incentives for bringing an action are sufficiently
high. However, courts can also be asked to prevent harmful
actions from taking place. The procedural means is to file a
motion for a preliminary injunction.
By contrast, regulators make and enforce law both ex post
and ex ante. Because regulators enforce law proactively, they
can initiate enforcement proceedings when they find that the
level of expected harm is sufficiently high. Moreover, they can
54. Here, we assume there are no incentive issues in collecting evidence.
In focusing on incentive issues, Glaeser et al. show that regulators may be
more effective law enforcers because they can be better incentivized.
Glaeser et al., supra note 13, at 854. For further details, see discussion of
their approach in Part III.C infra.
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use their residual lawmaking powers to adapt and change rules
in response to socioeconomic or technological change they
observe and thereby enhance their ability to enforce the law at
optimal levels. 55 Regulators can exercise their lawmaking
rights more flexibly than legislatures can. They need not go
through a lengthy lawmaking process, but may, within the
scope of their lawmaking rights, adapt and change the law in a
simplified procedure. As long as their jurisdiction is suffi-
ciently well-defined by law, which is democratically legitimized,
this does not infringe on the powers of legislatures.
The lawmaking function of regulators has been recog-
nized in the literature before. In fact, regulation is often
equated with rulemaking rather than with proactive enforce-
ment, which in this Article's theory is a crucial element of reg-
ulatory functions. Shavell, for example, examines the differ-
ence between liability and safety regulations for accidents. 56
He conjectures that liability is invoked after harm has been
done. By contrast, regulation determines a certain level of
care the regulator finds desirable, which is imposed on eco-
nomic actors ex ante. Shavell argues that since the regulator
cannot observe the level of risk, ex ante rule making will not
be optimal. 57 This argument is well taken when lawmakers
cannot easily adjust the law over time. Legislatures, for exam-
ple, face higher procedural constraints and costs in changing
the law than regulators do and therefore cannot easily adjust
the rules in response to observed changes. Regulators, by con-
trast, have more limited lawmaking powers-only those the
legislature delegates to them-but can make changes more
flexibly. In addition, and crucially from the point of view of
55. Regulators are not always successful in implementing such rules. Re-
call that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, under its former
chair Arthur Levitt, Jr., made a 2000 proposal to Congress to constrain audit-
ing firms from taking on consulting business for the same firms they audit,
but that this attempt was stopped by strong opposition from auditing firms
and did not find support in Congress. SeeJackie Spinner, "You Were Right:"
Lawmakers Face SEC Chief Who Warned of Auditors' Conflicts, WASH. POST, Jan.
25, 2002, at El. The article describes the lobbying efforts by Arthur Ander-
sen and other firms to prevent this measure. See id.
56. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13J. LEGAL
STUD. 357 (1984) [hereinafter Shavell, Liability Versus Regulation]; Steven
Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 271 (1984) [hereinafter Shavell, Liability and Safety Regulation].
57. Shavell, Liability and Safety Regulation, supra note 56, at 273-74.
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the incomplete law concept, regulators are not only rule mak-
ers but also law enforcers.
E. Institutional Choice
The previous section analyzed the major characteristics of
courts and regulators as holders of residual LMLE powers.
This section seeks to identify the factors that will determine
the optimal allocation of LMLE power to either courts or regu-
lators. It should be noted at the outset that there is no regime
choice issue in the first best world, where law is complete and
an optimally designed law fully can deter harmful actions.
The goal here is to optimize the allocation of LMLE powers in
a world of second bests where law is incomplete.
Already, some drawbacks of courts as holders of residual
LMLEP have been identified and comparative advantages of
regulators noted. Regulation is also not without cost. The di-
rect costs of regulation include the funds needed to hire
monitors and investigators, to maintain filing systems, and to
launch lawsuits. 58 The indirect costs of regulation are com-
prised of the costs market participants incur because they have
to comply with regulation and that society incurs when regula-
tors either over- or under-enforce the law. Just like courts and
legislatures, regulators may err by either over- or under-enforc-
ing the law. Their advantage is that-absent incentive
problems-they can correct for past errors on their own initia-
tive and in a flexible and responsive manner. Over-regulation
occurs when a regulation imposes costs that outweigh the ben-
efits of proactive law enforcement, i.e., when it enjoins too
many potentially beneficial actions or when well-intentioned
regulation stifles economic activities in other ways. Regulators
may also under-enforce because they face resource constraints,
misallocate their resources, or fail to detect harmful actions.59
58. Shavell points out that regulators operate even when there is no
harm. Shavell, Liability Versus Regulation, supra note 56, at 364. The same is
true for courts, of course, unless a legal system relies exclusively on ad hoc
dispute settlement institutions. However, courts may shift to different sub-
jects when there is a drop in litigation, whereas regulators are much more
specialized law enforcers.
59. On the tradeoff between monitoring and investigating and the cost
implications of these regulatory enforcement mechanisms, see Dilip Mook-
herjee & 1. P. L. Png, Monitoring vis-d-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law, 82
AM. ECON. REv. 556, 557 (1992). Using a formal model to compare the
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Recognizing these limits of law enforcement by courts, on the
one hand, and of regulators on the other, the question is
under what conditions it may be optimal to allocate LMLEP to
courts, to (re-)allocate them to regulators, or to complement
court enforcement with regulatory enforcement. While hold-
ing incentive problems and the vulnerability to corruption
constant, two important factors are suggested: standardization
and the level of expected harm (externality).
Standardization refers to the ability to describe actions
and outcomes at reasonable cost so that regulators can exer-
cise their proactive law enforcement powers effectively. The
effectiveness of proactive law enforcement hinges on the abil-
ity of regulators to monitor the market and identify types of
actions and outcomes that reasonably may be expected to re-
sult in harmful outcome. The assessment of which actions or
outcomes fulfill these conditions may change over time. Yet it
is essential that regulators be able to identify and standardize
in order to use their resources effectively and avoid the pitfall
of over-enforcing. Take the example of securities regulation,
which is analyzed in greater detail in Part IV below. If regula-
tors are unable to distinguish whether harm to the investing
public results from the very act of issuing securities, from issu-
ing securities to small investors, from certain companies issu-
ing securities, or from companies issuing securities without in-
forming investors about key aspects of the company and its fu-
ture growth potential, then they are unable to determine what
actions they should prevent or may use their powers to prevent
public offering altogether. Only when the "right" harmful ac-
tions have been identified can a regulator take the relevant
actions.
This insight has important implications for proactive law
enforcers and the timing of ex ante lawmaking. Take the ex-
ample of German stock exchange regulation in the late 19th
century. 611 After a serious crash of the markets, German
tradeoffs, Mookherjee and Png conclude that the use of these alternative
enforcement devices should be tailored to the severity of the offense.
Smaller offenses should not be investigated, merely monitored. Larger of-
fenses should be investigated in accordance with their severity, and fines
should be maximized. Id.
60. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE LJ. 1, 54
(2001) [hereinafter Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership].
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lawmakers believed that the major harm resulted from expos-
ing ignorant, small investors to the whims of large corpora-
tions.6 1 They therefore reasoned that small investors should
be prevented from investing in large publicly held enterprises
and effectively prevented these investors from acquiring shares
in joint stock corporations by stipulating that each share had
to be issued and sold for no less than the nominal value of
R.M. 1,000-which was beyond the reach of most investors at
the time.62
Meanwhile, most legal systems focus on disclosure obliga-
tions and do not attempt to regulate who may or may not in-
vest in large corporations. 63 The identification of this prob-
lem and the kind of information that is deemed relevant for
investors has made it possible to devise a proactive enforce-
ment regime. Securities regulators can monitor disclosure
and can further stipulate the kind of information that needs to
be disclosed. The relevance of individual items whose disclo-
sure is required is often debated. 64 Nevertheless, there is little
disagreement over the importance of disclosure, though there
is still debate about whether disclosure should be mandatory.6 5
The second factor that determines the optimal regime
choice is the level of expected harm. The constraints of ex
post lawmaking and reactive law enforcement may be tolerable
when the expected level of harm is low, for example, when the
harm victims might suffer is small or when only a few victims
are affected by harmful actions. Noise emission by an individ-
ual household will affect only the immediate neighbors, who
can identify the cause and therefore are able to bring action
and seek remedies using courts as reactive law enforcers. By
contrast, when a factory emits pollutants, many more people
61. Id. at 56.
62. Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-County
Comparison, 23 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 822-23 (2002) [hereinafter Pistor
et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law].
63. See generally INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAw U. Michael Robinson ed.,
1992) (summarizing securities laws in twenty-two countries).
64. For a major attack on the SEC's disclosure regime, see GEORGE J.
BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE USA 189-92
(1976).
65. For a summary and critical assessment of the relevant literature on
this issue, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373-80 (1997-1998).
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may be affected. As long as the level of harm they suffer is
limited, it may be sufficient to provide enforcement through
the court system and to create incentives for using the court
system by allowing class action suits, granting treble damages,
and the like. If, however, the level of expected harm is sub-
stantial, as in the case of nuclear power plants, court enforce-
ment will not be effective. It will typically come too late, after
harm has been done. Shifting to a proactive law enforcement
regime that seeks to prevent the occurrence of harm through
entry barriers, continuous monitoring, and investigation, will
therefore be superior.
To summarize, regulators perform different functions
than courts. As proactive law enforcers, regulators can enjoin
actions and initiate enforcement procedures, which is an im-
portant advantage over courts when law is incomplete. As con-
tinuous lawmakers, they can change rules in response to varia-
tions in markets they observe, independent of whether viola-
tions have occurred, or when others have brought problems to
their attention. Still, even these factors do not lead to regula-
tors in all areas of the law and cannotjustify the establishment
of regulators in all cases. The cost of proactive law enforce-
ment by regulators can be justified only when actions can be
standardized and when these actions are likely to create sub-
stantial harm and negative externalities, which cannot be fully
remedied by reactive law enforcement.
This Article suggests that financial markets are an area
where regulation can be justified, i.e., the benefits of introduc-
ing regulators may offset the costs of doing so. If cheating is
restricted to a couple of shareholders, it will not undermine
the viability of financial markets. Widespread stock fraud,
however, can seriously undermine investors' confidence in
capital markets and hurt the economy. 66 This happened in
66. See generally Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 782, 804-15 (2001) (arguing that a
strong public securities market depends on investors' confidence that corpo-
rate insiders will not engage in self-dealing transactions). The proposition
that mandatory disclosure can help avoid externalities is highly disputed in
legal literature. Proponents of this proposition include Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competi-
tion in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1490-91 (1992) (arguing that
disclosure rules by states would result in sub-optimal levels of disclosure, as
disclosure by a public company confers positive externalities on other corn-
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the stock market crash of 1929.67 More recently, the disclo-
sure that several companies' earnings reports were seriously
misleading has led to an erosion of investor confidence in the
United States, as evidenced by the dramatic decline of stock
markets. 68 This has led some commentators to draw parallels
to the events of the late 1920s and the regulatory responses
that followed in the early 1930s. 69 More generally, the history
of the law governing financial markets, which is further ad-
dressed in Part IV below, demonstrates the ingenuity of mar-
ket actors in developing schemes to defraud investors in ways
that time and again proved to be beyond the reach of existing
law. Attempts to deter such actions by enhancing the com-
pleteness of case or statutory law alone have proven to be un-
successful because the law constantly lagged behind new mar-
ket developments, including new methods of cheating inves-
tors. The inability of lawmakers to prevent harmful actions in
the future simply by making law more complete eventually
gave way to the emergence of regulators, first in the form of
stock exchanges, and later in the form of state regulators.
These agents have enhanced, though not perfected, the effec-
tiveness of law enforcement in the field of securities regula-
tion.70 This history seems to be repeated with the establish-
ment of a new regulatory body for overseeing accounting
panies), and Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Is-
suer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369 (1999). Op-
ponents include Roberta Romano, supra note 65, at 2368, and FRANK H. EAS-
TERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF CORPORATE
LAw 286-90, 296-97 (1991).
67. SeeJoel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatoy Corporate Disclo-
sure System, 9 J. CoRP. L. 1, 23-33 (1983) [hereinafter Seligman, Historical
Need] (discussing the link between securities fraud and the 1920s bull market
which preceded the 1929 crash); PeterJ. Dennin, Which Came First, the Fraud
or the Market: Is the Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory Valid Under Rule lOb-5?, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 2611, 2615 (2001) (noting that Congress passed the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act in order to reduce the securities fraud which had
contributed to the 1929 crash).
68. David S. Hilzenrath, Former Rite Aid Officials Indicted, WASH. POST.,
June 22, 2002, at Al.
69. Gerald F. Seib &John Harwood, What Could Bring 1930s-Style Reform of
U.S. Businesses?, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2002, at Al.
70. See discussion infra Part IV.
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firms, which had been left out of the 1993-34 regulatory frame-
work. 7 1
This theory is also consistent with the account of contem-
porary observers of the rise of the regulatory state in the U.S.
Landis, who later served as chairman of the SEC, explained
the emergence of the administrative process in his 1938 book
as the growing complexity of social and economic relations in
the process of industrialization on the one hand, and the inad-
equacy of judicial lawmaking and law enforcement under
these conditions on the other. 72 He described the need for
"uninterrupted supervisory interest"-what today would be
called monitoring-as "incompatible with the demands of ju-
dicial office"' 73 and the need for uniformity in applying law to
different cases. In his view, this could be achieved by the judi-
cial process only through the time-consuming process of ap-
peal to higher courts.7 4 In addition, he argued that the pro-
cess of litigation had left "too much in the way of the enforce-
ment of claims and interests to private initiative." 75 The slow
process of adjudication created "the demand for a power to
initiate action." 76 Landis also pointed out that an important
difference between the judicial process and the administrative
process is the latter's power of independent investigation,
which he deems crucial both for initiating enforcement and
for the development of adequate rules.
77
Landis recognized that the administrative process often
combines lawmaking and law enforcement functions, which,
in accordance with the classic division of powers, should be
vested with different branches of the government. 78 Moreo-
ver, he argued that this combination of lawmaking and law en-
71. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).
72. SeeJAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
73. Id. at 33.
74. Id. To these considerations, he adds the idea that lawmaking in some
areas requires practical expertise rather than general judicial reasoning
("[T]here are certain fields where the making of law springs less from gener-
alizations and principles drawn from the majestic authority of textbooks and
cases, than from a 'practical' judgment .... ). Id.
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id. at 35.
77. Id. at 37-41.
78. "No one can fail to recognize that there are dangers implicit in this
combination of functions in an administrative agency." Id. at 95.
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forcement powers was a response to the inadequacies of the
judicial process. In his view, judges and judge-made law were
slow to respond to changes in the environment. 79 He also sug-
gested that the administrative process was not without checks,
including the narrow scope of jurisdiction regulators possess
as compared to courts; the professionalism of the regulator;
the need to produce facts to sustain an order; the indepen-
dence of administrative tribunals, which was ensured by a divi-
sion of labor within the administration; and, finally, judicial
review of administrative orders. 80
III. INCOMPLETENESS OF LA-W AND RELATED THEORIES
This section places the incomplete law framework in the
context of related literatures, including the incompleteness of
contracts, the indeterminacy of law, and theories on regula-
tion. It does not attempt a comprehensive survey of these liter-
atures but rather seeks to distinguish this framework from re-
lated theories."'
A. Incomplete Contract Theory
The incomplete law concept is inspired by the incom-
pleteness of contracts theory as developed in the literature of
economics. The notion that contracts are incomplete is now
widely recognized. 8 2 The concept was introduced as a critical
ingredient to explain property rights and the boundary of the
firm. 8 3 According to incomplete contract literature, a contract
is complete if all relevant contingencies and corresponding
control rights-the contractual rights and obligations of the
79. See id.
80. See id. at 98-101.
81. Part II of this Article discusses the law enforcement literature at some
length, so it is not addressed in this section.
82. For discussions about the theoretical foundation of incomplete con-
tracts see Hart & Moore, supra note 16, and Eric Maskin &Jean Tirole, Un-
foreseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999).
83. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691
(1986); Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the
Firm, 98J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120-22 (1990); OLIVER D. HART, FiRMs, CON-
TRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 6 (1995).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
20031
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
parties-are specified unambiguously.8 4 Complete contracts
ostensibly resolve all possible future disputes between the con-
tractual parties ex ante.8 5 A contract is incomplete when some
relevant contingencies are missing, or some items are specified
ambiguously.8 6 As a result, the contract is not legally enforcea-
ble and cannot independently resolve future disputes. Parties
will therefore need to make provisions allocating residual
rights to make decisions when unspecified events happen.87
The incomplete contract literature has only begun to be ab-
sorbed by legal scholars. 8s
The main difference between the incomplete law concept
and the incomplete contract theory is the subject of inquiry.
The incomplete contract literature is concerned with private
contracts among economic agents and seeks to optimize the
allocation of residual rights in economic efficiency terms. 89
The focus of the incomplete law concept is the legal system,
i.e., the multitude of social contracts that bind lawmakers, law
enforcers, and all individuals under their jurisdiction for long
periods of time. A major concern for the allocation of residual
lawmaking and law enforcement powers is that in a country
governed by the rule of law, law must in principle be general
and apply equally to all individuals. These principles limit the
extent to which law enforcement can be optimized by writing
as complete a law as might otherwise be possible (i.e., by writ-
ing multiple single case laws). They also limit the scope for
renegotiation, as retroactive lawmaking is restricted by princi-
ples such as nulla poena sine lege. This is particularly true in the
area of criminal law. The incompleteness of contract theory
does not face similar constraints. It can therefore experiment
more freely with determining the optimal allocation of
residual rights of contracts and strategies to enhance the com-
84. Ilya Segal, Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete
Contracts, 66 REv. ECON. STUD. 57, 57 (1999).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Michel Nakhla, Information, Coordination, and Contractual Relation in
Firms, 23 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 101, 105 (2003).
88. See EGGLESTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 2-3. For an analysis of U.S.
contract law using the incomplete contract theory, see Robert Scott, A Theory
of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1641 (2003).
89. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93-95 (1989).
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pleteness of contracts. 90 Moreover, the incomplete contract
literature assumes the existence of courts to enforce contracts.
When law is incomplete and LMLEP are allocated differently,
this will affect contract enforcement and have implications for
the design of contracts ex ante. Introducing the incomplete
law concept therefore opens the door to endogenize legal and
contractual design issues, which should stimulate further re-
search and analysis.
B. Indeterminacy of Law
This Article's contribution is not to restate the basic ob-
servation that neither statutory nor case law can unambigu-
ously predict the outcome of a particular case. This is a well-
known fact. Instead, its major contribution is to provide an
analytical framework based on the notion that law is incom-
plete for purposes of understanding differences in the design
and functioning of legal institutions.
Legal literature has long recognized the phenomenon
herein called "incomplete law," and has referred to it as the
"indeterminacy" of law. Legal philosophers, foremost among
them H.L.A. Hart, have argued that it is "a feature of the
human predicament" that we simply cannot "regulate, unam-
biguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means
of general standards to be used without further official direc-
tion on particular occasions."9 1 The world is simply too com-
plex.9 2
Compared with this Article's approach, indeterminacy
literature-or rather the various indeterminacy literatures-
tend to have a strong normative connotation. 93 An important
90. See, e.g., id. at 91, 93 (proposing a strategy designed to give parties an
incentive affirmatively to choose the contract provision they prefer ex ante,
thereby enhancing the completeness of the contract).
91. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 128 (2d ed. 1994).
92. In the words of Hart, "If the world in which we live were character-
ized only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the
modes in which they could combine were known to us, then provision could
be made in advance for every possibility." He adds, "Plainly this world is not
our world." Id.
93. An exception is a recent Article by Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competi-
tion Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. RE-v. 1908 (1998),
which applies the "indeterminacy" concept to explain the political economy
of rule making. He suggests that the legal profession in the state of Dela-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2003]
IIERNA770NAL LAW AND POITICS
issue in the critical legal studies literature that addresses the
problem of indeterminacy is the compatibility of indetermi-
nate law with rule of law. The "discovery" that law is not as
firm a guide for resolving cases as legal formalists would have it
(legal formalism is often described as the idea that judges are
subject to the law and that alone) sheds doubts on the admin-
istration of justice by judges accountable only to the law. 94
The indeterminacy debate seeks to critique or reconcile-de-
pending on which side of the debate one stands-basic princi-
ples of justice and rule of law with the argument that law does
not determine outcome but at best constrains the choices law
enforcers face.9 5 By contrast, from the vantage point of the
incomplete law concept, this Article suggests that core features
of the rule of law (such as generality of and the principle of
equality before the law) imply that the law is incomplete, or
that incomplete law and rule of law go together.96
ware has a vested interest in writing highly indeterminate corporate law, be-
cause this gives it a comparative advantage over other states. Delaware com-
petes to be the location for incorporation of major companies against states
that could easily copy Delaware corporate law-as some have in fact done-
to undermine Delaware's dominant role. Indeterminate law, however, re-
quires substantial involvement of legal professionals in applying the law to
real cases. The specialization of the legal profession in corporate law in Del-
aware is difficult for other jurisdictions to emulate, and is valued by share-
holders, managers, and other corporate stakeholders that benefit from high-
quality corporate law. See id. at 1910-12.
94. Radical critiques have used the concept of legal indeterminacy to ar-
gue that "law is politics" and to debunk the concept of the rule of law as a
myth. Since law does not determine the outcome of a particular dispute,
other factors, including political preferences of judges or the political clout
of the parties to the dispute, must. There is a range of more nuanced uses of
the concept. Many have rejected the radical notion of indeterminacy and
distinguish law's ability to determine outcome (which it cannot) from the law's
ability to constrain outcomes (which it does). The emerging consensus ap-
pears to be that law is neither radically indeterminate nor fully determinate.
For an excellent summary of this debate with further references, see Law-
rence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A CoMPAION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
95. See id. at 488-89.
96. This is similar to Friedrich A. Hayek's proposition that any attempt to
write precise law undermines the impartiality of the legislatures and is there-
fore inconsistent with the rule of law:
If the state is precisely to foresee the incidence of its actions, it
means that it can leave those affected no choice. Wherever the state
can exactly foresee the effects on particular people of alternative
courses of action, it is also the state which chooses between the
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The focus of this analysis, however, is different. Starting
from the premise that law is incomplete and recognizing that
important constraints in the design of legal institutions follow
from the rule of law, this Article investigates possible institu-
tional responses to incomplete law problems, in particular the
allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers.
It attempts to determine which among several options is supe-
rior given certain identified conditions and constraints. It is
worth mentioning that some legal indeterminacy literature
(e.g., Hart) has made observations about the function of
courts and of regulation. 97 However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, these insights have not been developed into a full-
fledged, conceptual framework suitable for analyzing legal in-
stitutions, and, in fact, they have been largely ignored by theo-
ries on regulation.
C. Theories on Regulation
There is a substantial literature on regulation in econom-
ics, political science, and law. A popular treatment of regula-
different ends. If we want to create new opportunities open to all,
to offer chances of which people can make what use they like, the
precise results cannot be foreseen. General rules, genuine laws as
distinguished from specific orders, must therefore be intended to
operate in circumstances which cannot be foreseen in detail, and,
therefore, their effect on particular ends or particular people can-
not be known beforehand. It is in this sense alone that it is at all
possible for the legislator to be impartial. To be impartial means to
have no answer to certain questions-to the kind of questions,
which, if we have to decide them, we decide by tossing a coin. In a
world where everything was precisely foreseen, the state could
hardly do anything and remain impartial.
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 76 (1944). Our theory differs
from his in that we do not take a normative stand on whether incomplete
law is good or bad.
97. Hart expounded:
Sometimes the sphere to be legally controlled is recognized from
the start as one in which the features of individual cases will vary so
much in socially important but unpredictable respects, that uni-
form rules to be applied from case to case without further official
direction cannot usefully be framed by the legislature in advance.
Accordingly, to regulate such a sphere the legislature sets up very
general standards and then delegates to an administrative, rule-
making body acquainted with the varying types of case, the task of
fashioning rules adapted to their special needs.
HART, supra note 91, at 131.
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tion in economics literature regards it as "any" intervention by
the state to address market failures when there are externali-
ties and/or informational problems. 98 That literature, how-
ever, does not differentiate between types of non-market
forces. By contrast, this Article identifies structural differences
in the timing and process of lawmaking and law enforcement
that distinguish these agents and help explain why, under cer-
tain conditions, vesting one or the other with residual lawmak-
ing and law enforcement powers may be superior. By defining
regulation as proactive law enforcers and courts as reactive law
enforcers, one can easily show that if the only concern is mar-
ket failure, there may be no need for regulation. This is be-
cause court-enforced law may be able to solve market failure
problems effectively. A complete, court-enforced law requir-
ing compulsory insurance, for example, could solve insurance
market failure problems. Insurance market failure is associ-
ated with the fact that most potential injurers are under-in-
sured.9 9 Similarly, a complete, court-enforced law requiring
compulsory warranty for any product sold could solve the used
car market failure problem caused by informational asymme-
try and externalities in the market.' 00 Such a law would essen-
tially eliminate the problem of asymmetry between buyer and
seller by shifting liability to the seller. These solutions would
be costly, but they demonstrate that complete law could solve
information problems and, by implication, show that market
failure alone is not sufficient to justify regulation.
The core of this Article's argument is that law is incom-
plete and that, under incomplete law, reactive law enforce-
ment is often insufficient to achieve optimal levels of law en-
forcement. Moreover, courts cannot perform the same func-
tions as regulators, as this would violate their role as impartial
arbiters. If courts performed the same proactive enforcement
and ex ante lawmaking functions, this would turn them into
regulators. Given incomplete law and these constraints on
courts, court-enforced law incurs deterrence failure problems.
98. ANTHONY B. ATKINSON &JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC Ec-
ONOMICS 5-10 (1980).
99. Id.
100. On the "lemons" problem in the used-car market, see George A.
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons:" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 35:931
INCOMPLETE LAW
The introduction of a different agent as a proactive law en-
forcer-a regulator-can improve this situation. 10 1
This is not the first time it has been suggested that en-
forcement by regulators may, under certain conditions, be an
improvement over law enforcement by courts. A recent paper
by Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer suggests that enforcement
by regulators may be more effective than enforcement by
courts when the enforcement requires investment in costly evi-
dence collection, because it is easier to design incentives for
regulators than for courts to optimize their law enforcement
activities.' 0 2 Although complementary, this theory differs
from that approach. As shown in the model,10 3 under incom-
plete law, court-enforced law may suffer from deterrence fail-
ure problems even when the problem of evidence has been
resolved. A similar case is made in the discussion of the elec-
tricity theft cases in Part II of this Article.' 0 4 Thus, it is sug-
gested that the problem law enforcers face is not limited to the
collection of evidence, and there may be a need for regula-
tors-in addition to courts-to ensure effective law enforce-
ment even under the assumption that both agents are opti-
mally incentivized.
This argument also differs from the public choice litera-
ture on regulation, which was inspired by the work of Stigler'0 5
101. A fully developed positive theory of regulation would have to account
for the process by which new forms of law enforcement (proactive as op-
posed to reactive) become law, which requires a full account of political dy-
namics. Nevertheless, the fact that many countries faced with the problem
of rapid socioeconomic change selected similar solutions does suggest that
politics-which we presume to be different across countries and to serve dif-
ferent interest groups-cannot fully explain the emergence of regulators.
102. Glaeser et al., supra note 13, at 897. For related arguments on the
importance of securities market regulation in transition economies and
emerging markets, see Jack C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Govern-
ance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (1997);
Katharina Pistor, Law as a Determinant for Equity Market Development: The Expe-
rience of Transition Economies, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES 249 (Peter Murrell ed., 2001); and Bernard Black, The Legal and
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. RE. 782,
848-49 (2001).
103. See Xu & PISTOR, LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER INCOMPLETE LAW, supra
note 18.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
105. Stigler, supra note 8.
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and Posner' 0 6 in the early 1970s. The emergence of regulators
and the regulatory state is explained in this literature primarily
by interest groups' desire to establish an agency that would
protect or enhance their interests. 10 7 A substantial literature
along this line of thinking has emerged to explain the behav-
ior of regulators, both in support of and as a critique of public
choice literature.108
The incomplete law concept is complementary to the
public choice theory of regulation. Indeed, although shifts in
political bargaining power may explain the timing of the estab-
106. Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974).
107. Id. at 341-42.
108. Meanwhile, this approach has come under increasing criticism for
failing to account fully for the justification as well as the behavior of regula-
tors. In what might be regarded a comprehensive critique of the public
choice literature, CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECON-
CEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990), identifies eight ends for which regu-
lation may be undertaken: response to market failure; public-interested re-
distribution of resources; achievement of collective desires and aspirations;
promotion of diverse experiences and preferences; reduction of social sub-
ordination; reduction of undesirable preferences; prevention of outcomes
that may prove irreversible and harmful to future generations; and achieve-
ments of interest group transfers. Id. at 48-71. Note that some of these ex-
planations are fully consistent with our theory, in particular the desire to
prevent outcomes that may prove irreversible. As argued above, in these
cases reactive enforcement by the courts is not sufficient, and thus a shift of
law enforcement rights to proactive enforcers, such as regulators, becomes
crucial. Recent behavioral and psychological research, including controlled
experiments, have shown that individuals do not act only in their own self-
interest. This literature has questioned the basic assumptions of the public
choice literature. This change in the administrative law literature is re-
flected in Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory
State, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 267 (2002). At this symposium, the public choice
perspective was represented by Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in
Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 280 (2002). Most of the
other papers presented alternatives for understanding the functioning of
regulators. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the
Meaning of the Modem State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 309 (2002) (proposing a theory based on phenomenology).
For an approach that uses cognitive psychology, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 COR-
NELL L. REv. 549 (2002). The differences between the various approaches to
analyzing agency behavior in the administrative law literature are neatly cap-
tured in an essay by Jerry L. Mashaw, Essay: Deconstructing Debate, Reconstruct-
ing Law, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 682, 682 (2002), which describes the two fac-
tions as "idealists" and "realists."
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lishment of regulators and the powers allocated to them, some
critical features and functions of regulators cannot be ex-
plained by public choice literature. For example, regulatory
functions as defined here-proactive law enforcement and
continuous lawmaking-emerged in different countries in re-
sponse to very similar events. An example is the growth of
stock markets and the challenges transactions in financial in-
struments posed to existing enforcement mechanisms (see
Part V, infra). This finding is difficult to reconcile with the
prevailing public choice explanations, which focus almost ex-
clusively on the United States.
The incomplete law concept as developed in this Article is
probably closest to Goldberg's work.1°19 Goldberg suggested
twenty-five years ago that regulation might best be understood
as a device to manage long-term contracts, which create seri-
ous enforcement problems."l 0 This argument can be ex-
tended to the analysis that understands laws as social contracts
between the state and multiple current and future addressees.
D. Summary
The notion that law is incomplete is closely related to a
number of existing theories and consistent with contemporary
analysis of the emergence of financial market regulation in the
first half of the 20th century. The novelty of this Article's ana-
lytical framework is that it allows assessment of the design and
evolution of legal institutions as well as legal systems. Incom-
plete law is the foundation of this analytical framework. The
allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers
and the detailed analysis of how institutions differ in the way in
which they use these powers are its analytical tools. This Arti-
cle uses this framework to analyze law enforcement, but the
implications of this theory go much further. In particular, the
theory can be used to compare legal systems-as suggested by
the brief discussion of civil law versus common law countries-
109. See Victor Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J.
ECON. 426 (1976).
110. Id. at 426-27. George L. Priest makes a similar argument in his analy-
sis of the historical origins of utilities regulation. See George L. Priest, The
Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 289, 294-95 (1993).
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and to analyze lawmaking and law enforcement in countries
where the choice of legal institutions may be more limited."'
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF FINANcIAL MARKET REGULATION
IN ENGLAND
This Part uses the development of financial market regu-
lation in England as an illustration of the theoretical frame-
work that was developed in Part II. Since financial market reg-
ulation is too broad a subject, the analysis is limited to the le-
gal regime governing misrepresentation of information when
shares are offered to the public.
The choice of jurisdiction was motivated by several fac-
tors. England was not only the first industrializing economy
but also among the first to develop a sophisticated financial
market for corporate securities." 2 As the mother country of
the common law and a legal system widely considered to have
effective courts,' 1 3 England offers an excellent case for testing
the effectiveness of judge-made law in coping with the chal-
lenges of rapid socioeconomic and technological change that
accompanied the development of financial markets. Common
law is known to evolve incrementally as new cases are brought
to court. In fact, a major part ofjudicial reasoning is to distin-
guish new cases from old ones and to determine whether ex-
isting law extends to factually new cases. While theorists of the
common law do not use the term "incompleteness of the law,"
the idea that the common law is constantly challenged by new
developments is widely acknowledged.1 14 As noted above,
some scholars have argued that this process is more likely to
111. This line of research is pursued in Pistor & Xu, Beyond Law Enforce-
ment: Governing Financial Markets in China and Russia, in BUILDING A TRUST-
WORTHY STATE (Janos Kornai & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., forthcoming
2004).
112. Cf GEORGE W. EDWARDS, THE EVOLUTION OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 25-
26 (1967) (discussing the rise of a corporate securities market in England).
Arguably, the Netherlands had the first market in corporate securities after
the Dutch East Indian Company began floating shares to investors in 1609.
LARRY NEAL, THE RISE OF FINANCIAL CAPITALISM: INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS IN THE AGE OF REASON 8-9 (1990).
113. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 1193, 1193-94 (2002).
114. Standard textbooks on legal methods discuss this concept. For exam-
ple, see GINSBURG, supra note 26, at 1-2.
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achieve efficient law than top-down legislated law.'1 5 Using
the case law on misrepresentation of information as an exam-
ple, this Article seeks to explore the effectiveness of lawmaking
and law enforcement in the hands of courts in an area that was
and remains highly susceptible to socioeconomic and techno-
logical change.
Moreover, in light of the extensive literature on the emer-
gence of the regulatory state in the U.S. since the late 19th
century, 1 6 it seems advisable to focus on a different country,
where political and economic conditions were quite different.
In fact, financial market regulation in the United Kingdom
prior to the state's assumption of greater regulatory powers
with the Big Bang reforms in 1986 has been lauded as vastly
superior to the regulatory model created in the U.S. following
the 1929 stock market crash.'1 7 However, closer inspection
reveals that regulatory functions emerged in England long
before the Big Bang reforms of 1986. Since the late 19th cen-
tury, the Companies Act (CA) incorporated many provisions
on disclosure that later became part of the securities regula-
tions in the U.S.18 Further, the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) gradually assumed the right to screen companies that
wished to list on the exchange and to issue disclosure rules." 19
As explained below, these powers were not as extensive as
those exercised by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but
they existed nevertheless. In addition, the Department of
115. See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD.
51 (1977); cf George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of
Efficient Rules, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65-66 (1977) (arguing that the common
law process tends to create efficient rules).
116. See, e.g., RIGHTS AND REGULATION: ETHICAL, POLITICAL, AND Eco-
NOMIC ISSUES (Tibor R. Machan & M. Bruce Johnson eds., 1983); PETER L.
STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1989); STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION (Gary Fromm ed., 1981); SUN-
STEIN, supra note 108.
117. See BENSTON, supra note 64, at 189-92. For a more recent attack on
federal regulation of financial markets, see Romano, supra note 65, at 2367-
68.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 296-297.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 240-253. This Article does not dis-
tinguish between state and non-state regulators because the analysis is fo-
cused on the responsibility of issuers of securities to ensure that investors
receive relevant and truthful information before investing. From the per-
spective of the issuer, the distinction between state and non-state regulators
is less important than the function performed by these agents.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2003]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POI-77CS
Trade and Industry, as well as Company Registrars, carried out
some functions that were centralized by U.S.-style securities
regulation. 120 Similar trends are found in Germany, the third
example included in this analysis. 2 1 Common shifts from re-
active to proactive law enforcement and reallocation of law-
making powers to regulators (be they state or private) in sev-
eral countries suggests that factors other than those usually ad-
dressed in public choice literature might have been at work.
Finally, recent literature attributes the emergence of fi-
nancial market regulation to failures in the judicial system, in
particular endemic judicial corruption in the U.S. in the 19th
century. 12 2 While there are some allegations that English
courts were less rigorous with the well-off gentlemen who
came before them as directors or company promoters than
with smaller thieves or embezzlers, 123 there is less concern with
judicial failure in England during this period. Since this Arti-
cle argues that regulation that emerged in response to the fun-
damental problem of incomplete law could not be solved even
by a well-functioning court, for analytical purposes it is useful
to choose a country less tarnished by judicial malperformance
during this crucial period. In fact, little evidence is found in
the case law discussed below that judges misinterpreted the
law or that courts were of low quality. The rulings were consis-
tent with existing case law. They operated within institutional
constraints defined by statutory and case law and by the design
of courts as impartial arbiters, that is, as reactive law enforcers.
Within these constraints they did as well as any court might
have. In other words, our reading of the case law does not
suggest that the problem of incomplete law the courts faced
could have been overcome had they only been of better qual-
ity. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of the proper alloca-
tion of lawmaking and law enforcement rights.
In the subsequent analysis, the evolution of contract and
tort law in relation to misrepresentation of information in a
prospectus is first addressed. Part IV.A analyzes legislative re-
120. See infra text accompanying notes 253-262.
121. See infra Part V.B.
122. Coffee supra note 60, at 41. A similar argument was advanced shortly
afterwards by Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatoy
State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401, 402 (2003).
123. See GEORGE ROBB, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME IN MODERN ENGLAND: FINAN-
CIAL FRAUD AND BUSINESS MORALITY, 1845-1929 161-62 (1992).
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sponses to the challenges posed by the evolving securities mar-
ket. Finally, Part IV.B discusses the emergence of a regulatory
framework, which added proactive law enforcement by regula-
tors to the classic reactive law enforcement by courts.
A. The Incompleteness of Criminal, Contract, and Tort Law
In the 19th century, England assumed a leading role in
the development of liquid markets for corporate securities.12 4
The emergence of a market for financial instruments raised
the fundamental question of whether and to what extent ex-
isting law was applicable to these transactions. Under English
law, shares were considered personal property which could be
used and transferred as any other asset.' 2 5 By implication,
general principles of criminal, contract, and tort law applied.
The major principles of these areas of the law had been devel-
oped over centuries. The evolving market in securities ren-
dered many of these principles highly incomplete, as transac-
tions in rights challenged basic assumptions that had earlier
determined the threshold for criminal or civil liability and the
allocation of risks between the parties to the transaction.
1. Criminal Law
As in other areas of the law, criminal law in England de-
veloped primarily through case law. The first statutory law to
address the scope of criminal liability of those responsible for
publishing and disseminating a prospectus was the Larceny
Act of 1861.126 It established criminal liability for directors,
124. Even in England, corporate securities surpassed government bonds
as the dominant paper traded on stock exchanges only in the second half of
the 19th century. In 1853, 70.2% of the securities were issued by the British
government or other U.K. public bodies. In 1903, they accounted for only
15.8%. The most substantial increase came from securities issued by finan-
cial institutions (from 1.1% in 1853 to 6.3% in 1903) and commercial enter-
prises (from 1.8% in 1853 to 9.6% in 1903). Railway securities made tip the
largest fraction of non-state securities (18.5% in 1853, 44.1% in 1903), but
the growth can be attributed largely to listings of foreign, in particular U.S.,
railway companies. For details, see Tables 3.2 (listing nominal values of se-
curities quoted in pounds) and 3.3 (listing the percentages of nominal val-
ues of securities quoted) in RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK Ex-
CHANGE: A HISTORY 88-89 (1999).
125. Guy BROWN, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAw § 4.5, at 5, available at
http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/-guy/com204O/pdf/EnglishLaw.pdf.
126. The Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96, § 84 (Eng.).
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company managers, and others who knowingly included in the
prospectus false information that was material. 127 The Act
clearly required intent, which not only proved difficult to es-
tablish-a problem of evidence-but also raised a more funda-
mental legal question about the appropriate liability threshold
for the actions concerned.' 28 It is also noteworthy that the
crime is only a misdemeanor, not a felony. Moreover, the Act
addresses only the inclusion of false information, not the omis-
sion thereof.129 Case law increasingly revealed that the lack of
disclosure was at least as damaging to investors as the inclusion
of false information.' 30 The failure of earlier lawmakers to in-
corporate this concern into the Act's provisions is a good ex-
ample of their inability to foresee important and relevant fu-
ture contingencies.
Comprehensive criminal statistics are not available, but
secondary sources suggest that relatively few criminal charges
were brought successfully against key figures in the speculative
bubbles England experienced in the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies.' 3 ' One explanation is the rather high threshold crimi-
nal charges had to meet. 132 This is fully consistent with this
127. The Act reads as follows:
Whosoever, being a director, manager, or public officer of any
body corporate or public company, shall make, circulate, or pub-
lish, or concur in making, circulating, or publishing, any written
statement or account which he shall know to be false in any mate-
rial particular, with intent ... to induce any person . .. to intrust
[sic] or advance any property to such body corporate or public
company . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 133-137.
131. For a detailed account, see ROBB, supra note 123, at 162-64.
132. Another reason is the lack of capacity. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that England established a public prosecutor only in the 1870s. Previously,
victims of criminal acts acted as prosecutors. DAVID PHILIPS, CRIME AND Au-
THORITY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE BLACK COUNTRY 1835-1860 96 (1977).
Fraud actions were notoriously difficult to prove. Only after WWII was an
Anti-Fraud taskforce established at Scotland Yard. The Roskill Report, com-
pleted in 1986, found fraud prevention still highly wanting. This led to the
creation of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), which is part of the U.K. crimi-
nal justice system. See RONALD HowE, THE STORY OF SCOTLAND YARD 150
(1965); James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violations in the United
Kingdom, 9 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 131, 169 (1991); Michael Levi, The Roskill
Fraud Commission Revisited: An Assessment, II J. FIN. CRIME 38, 39 (2003);
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Article's theoretical analysis. Recall that criminal law is subject
to the nulla poena sine lege principle, which constrains state
power to prosecute and punish only on the basis of a firm legal
foundation. At the same time, this makes criminal law incom-
plete in the sense of Type II incompleteness, because items
that are not clearly specified in the law will not result in crimi-
nal liability.
Over time, the courts relaxed these principles somewhat,
but only reluctantly, as demonstrated in a finally successful
criminal charge against a famous company promoter of the
1920s, Kylsant.133 The prospectus of a mail steam shipping
company promoted by the defendant disclosed adequate
figures about the performance history of the company in ques-
tion. It did not mention, however, that in recent years busi-
ness had slowed considerably and the company had substantial
trading losses. 134 The court considered the 1861 Larceny Act,
which establishes criminal liability only for the inclusion of
wrongful information.1 35 In an appeal against the lower
court's conviction, the King's Bench had to clarify whether it
was permissible in criminal law to extend the wording of the
statute and convict under the law for omitting information
from a prospectus. The lower court had instructed the jury
that the criminal act must be "strictly construed." Neverthe-
less, it maintained that criminal liability for omitting facts was
covered by the wording of the statute. 136 The King's Bench
agreed. Even though each statement in the prospectus was lit-
erally true, the entire prospectus could be regarded as false
because of its omissions.13 7 This clarification came over sixty
years after the Larceny Act had been adopted.
Criminal convictions remained a rare event even after
courts established a broader scope of application for the Lar-
ceny Act. The legislature attempted to enhance the state's
ability to punish violators by revising criminal statutes as well as
by allocating additional resources to law enforcement agen-
Monty Raphael, Fraud on Tial-Reviewing the Roskill Legacy, 11 J. FIN. CRIME
8, 8 (2003).
133. See Rex. v. Kylsant, [1932] 1 K.B. 442 (Crim. App. 1931).
134. Id. at 443-44.
135. Id. at 442-45.
136. Id. at 444-45.
137. Id. at 448-49.
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cies. In 1939, the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act1 3 8
was adopted to address the outbreak of fraudulent share-push-
ing in the late 1930s. 139 The Act was replaced in 1958 by an-
other Act of the same name.' 40 It extended criminal liability
to reckless inclusion of wrongful information in secondary of-
ferings and also mentions the omission of material facts, where
previously only intentional acts could be punished. 14 1 In addi-
tion, the Act now imposed criminal liability on the dissemina-
tion of information concerning the issuance of securities un-
less this was done by way of a prospectus that complied with
the provisions of the Companies Act-even if the information
as such was correct. 14 2
2. Contract Law
Contractual claims under common law require the exis-
tence of a contractual relation between buyer and seller. They
could therefore be brought only by investors who bought se-
curities directly from the person (or agent) responsible for the
misrepresentation of information, not by shareholders who ac-
quired their shares on the secondary market.143 Contractual
relations establish special obligations between the parties, obli-
gations which neither of them owes to others, which makes
138. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 16
(Eng.).
139. See Barry A. K_ Rider, Global Trends in Securities Regulation: The Chang-
ing Legal Climate, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 513, 523 (1995).
140. Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45
(Eng.); see Rider, supra note 139, at 523 n.43.
141. § 13(1)(a). The provision reads as follows:
13.-(1) Any person who, by any statement, promise or forecast
which he knows to be misleading, false or deceptive, or by
any dishonest concealment of material facts, or by the
reckless making of any statement, promise or forecast
which is misleading, false or deceptive, induces or at-
tempts to induce another person-
(a) to enter into or offer to enter into-
(i) any agreement for, or with a view to, acquiring,
disposing of, subscribing for or underwriting se-
curities ...
shall be guilty of an offence, and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding seven years.
142. Id. § 14.
143. L. C. B. GOWER ET AL., GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW
383 (4th ed. 1979).
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contractual claims relatively easy to establish. At the same
time, courts sought to balance the rights and responsibilities of
the contracting parties. A crucial doctrine of contract law
courts redefined in light of new case law involving securities
was caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). The rule dates back
to the early 16th century. 14 4 Under this principle, failure to
examine a good properly destroys a claim based on con-
tract. 1 4 5 The doctrine assumes that both parties have equal ac-
cess to information and reflects what was perceived to be a
natural allocation of responsibilities between buyer and seller
with inherently conflicting interests. Trade in financial instru-
ments differs from trade in real assets in that it is more diffi-
cult for the buyer to examine the good he is purchasing. In
fact, reliance on information provided by others, including the
seller or intermediary, is the hallmark of financial market
transactions. When transactions in securities expanded, the
courts therefore faced the challenge of redefining the scope of
the seller's obligation to provide the buyer with information
and the scope of the buyer's obligation to make use of sources
of information that were readily available to him.' 46
The most important contractual remedy is rescission, i.e.,
the undoing of the contractual relationship. Existing contract
law ruled out the right to rescind a contract if the buyer had
affirmed the contract after the discovery of the facts that
would allow him to rescind the contract. An obvious example
is the continued use of the good even after the defects are
known. 1 47 The complex relationship between investor/share-
holders and the corporation raised new questions as to what
amounted to an affirmation of contracts: selling the shares;
advising a broker to sell them; attending a shareholder meet-
ing?148
144. The formulation of this doctrine apparently goes back to Anthony
Fitzherbert's 1533 Boke of Husbandrie, in which he warns the potential buyer
of a horse: "[I]f he be tame and have ben ridden upon, then Caveat
emptor." ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, BOKE OF HUSBANDRIE (London, Thomas
Berthelet 1533); see HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFTUNG [PROSPECTUS
LIABILITY] 21 n.18 (1985) [hereinafter ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAF-FUNG] (attrib-
uting the phrase to a 1534 version of the text).
145. M. P. FURMSTON, CHESIRE, FIFOOT AND FIRMSTON'S LAw OF CONTRACT
139 (13th ed. 1996).
146. See infra Part 1V.A.2.a.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 164-168.
148. See infra Part IV.A.2.b.
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Finally, courts had to come to terms with the problem of
balancing the rights of shareholders and creditors in a com-
pany with limited liability. The first statutory corporate law
passed in England, the Companies Act of 1844, allowed for
free incorporation of companies subject only to registration,
but did not grant shareholders limited liability by law. 149 Lim-
ited liability was accomplished only in 1855.150 The implica-
tion of this change was that creditors contracted only with the
corporation, not its shareholders, and therefore could enforce
their claims only against the corporation. This new arrange-
ment affected the contractual relation between the company
and its shareholders. Should rescission of the contract be al-
lowed even when the company was bankrupt, with the implica-
tion that investors would receive their money back before
creditors could enforce their claims?151
The following analysis will discuss how courts have han-
dled these three problem areas: caveat emptor, affirmation of
contracts, and the balancing of shareholders' and creditors'
contractual rights. 152
a. Caveat Emptor
To illustrate the incompleteness of existing contract law
with respect to trade in securities, consider the following case.
In 1865, Mr. Briggs acquired shares in a malt company. He
had read the prospectus, which listed the production and stor-
age of hops and malts as the firm's main business activities.' 53
He was not aware, however, that the provisions of the prospec-
tus were inconsistent with the articles of association.1 54 The
latter were accessible through the Registrar of Companies, and
indeed, the prospectus explicitly referred to this document. 55
149. An Act for the Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation of Joint
Stock Companies, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110, §§ 1, 15 (Eng.)
150. An Act for Limiting the Liability of Members of Certain Joint Stock
Companies, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 133, § 1 (Eng.) [hereinafter Limited Lia-
bility Act].
151. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
152. These three areas are only a selection of the legal challenges transac-
tions in securities posed to lawmakers and law enforcers, but a very instruc-
tive one.
153. Ex parte Briggs, I L.R.-Eq. 484 (1866).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Mr. Briggs consulted the articles of association only after the
shares had been allotted, and he discovered a clause that per-
mitted the directors of the company "to make advances of
money upon hops and other produce to the growers, produc-
ers, or sellers thereof, and to such other persons as they shall
think fit, and upon such security, negotiable or otherwise, as
they shall deem expedient." 56 In other words, beyond the
production and storage activities, the company also purported
to engage in financial activities. Upon learning this, Mr.
Briggs advised his broker to sell the shares; when this was im-
possible because trading in the shares had been suspended, he
sought to rescind the contract.157 The court held that "the
applicant for shares cannot plead ignorance of the clauses of
the articles of associations."158 Affirming the applicability of
caveat emptor to transactions in securities, the court thus made
it clear that it was the duty of the buyer to consult material
readily accessible to him. 159 Nevertheless, it did not take a fi-
nal view on this issue, because it rejected the appeal for differ-
ent reasons.1 60
This ruling did not put matters to rest. The law was still
incomplete because it did not specify the extent of the buyer's
obligation to inform himself. In a case decided by the House
of Lords only a year later, it was held that where the prospec-
tus was plainly false, the seller could not defend himself by
suggesting "that [the buyer] might have known the truth by
proper inquiry."'16 1 The relevant prospectus had disguised the
facts that the concession for constructing a railway in Vene-
zuela had yet to be acquired from middlemen, and that the
cost of this transaction would consume ten percent of the capi-
tal the company was claiming it raised for the purpose of ex-
ploration.1 62 Instead, the prospectus created the impression
that the necessary concessions had already been acquired.
Under these circumstances, the buyer had every right, in the
words of Lord Chelmsford, to "retort upon his objector, 'You,
156. Id.
157. Id. at 485.
158. Id. at 486.
159. Id. at 486-87.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 165-168.
161. Dirs. of the Cent. Ry. Co. of Venez. v. Kisch, 2 L.R.-E & I. App. 99
(1867).
162. Id. at 116-17.
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at least, who have stated what is untrue, or have concealed the
truth, for the purpose of drawing me into a contract, cannot
accuse me of want of caution because I relied implicitly upon
your fairness and honesty."1 63
Given the information asymmetry between parties to se-
curities transactions, the courts qualified the caveat emptor doc-
trine so that dishonest issuers could not use it as a simple de-
fense. The result was that the doctrine became less rigid, cre-
ating Type I incomplete law (broad, ambiguously defined
standards). As a result, the scope of contractual remedies was
enlarged, but at the cost of greater uncertainty about the obli-
gations buyers and sellers owed each other, creating more,
rather than less, demand for clarifying litigation.
b. Affirmation of Contract
According to contract law as it developed by the mid-19th
century, a claim to rescind a contract could fail if the buyer
took actions that affirmed the contract after he learned the
facts that supported rescission. 164 Existing law did not specify
the types of actions that would be regarded as affirmation in
the context of securities trading. Courts increasingly became
concerned that buyers of securities would gamble on a happy
outcome and hold the seller responsible if the the gamble did
not work in their favor.
In Ex parte Briggs, discussed above, the court suggested
that by requesting a broker sell his shares, Briggs acted as the
owner of shares, which indicated that he affirmed the contract
and thus forfeited his right to rescind it. 1 65 Since at the time
he knew of the contents of the articles of association and thus
knew the facts that allowed him to rescind the contract, he
implicitly affirmed the contract. 166 In the same spirit, the
chancery court denied a shareholder the right to rescind a
contract after he actively had supported the continuation of an
investment project-despite the fact that its terms clearly dif-
163. Id. at 121.
164. HORST ROLLER, DIE PROSPEKTHAFTUNG IM ENGLISHEN UND iM DEUT-
SCHEN RECHT [PROSPECTUS LIABILIrY IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAw] 127
(1991).
165. Ex parte Briggs, supra note 153, at 487.
166. Id. at 487.
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fered from those in the prospectus. 167 Affirming the court's
decision, the Court of Appeals explained that the shareholder
had the option to remonstrate at once, require that the pro-
spectus be acted on, and otherwise rescind. After the buyer
supported the deviation from the prospectus in an attempt to
salvage the investment project, he was bound by the terms of
the agreement. As a result, the company had the right to re-
quest the unpaid amount of shares to which he had sub-
scribed. 168
Other actions that were deemed by the courts to amount
to affirmations of contracts included attending shareholder
meetings and voting on shareholder issues. But could silence
also be regarded as affirmation? In In re Scottish Petroleum Com-
pany,169 a shareholder had subscribed to shares and paid part
of the purchase price in the belief that the directors named in
the prospectus would actually carry out their duties. When
two of the directors resigned shortly after his shares were allot-
ted, he requested to withdraw from the shareholder register
and asked that his money be returned. The company refused,
and after some communication back and forth the issue was
left unresolved. A year later, the company was liquidated and
the receiver continued prior demands to the shareholder to
pay the unpaid capital.1 70 The court held that, in principle,
the early resignation of the directors could justify the rescis-
sion of the contract.1 7' However, the inaction on the part of
the shareholder after the company denied his request for re-
scission was regarded as an affirmation. While some time to
take additional action is permissible, once a shareholder
knows all the facts, "he ought to lose [sic] no time in repudiat-
ing."'172 But does the same apply in cases where the share-
holder did not know these facts? Could he then later rescind
167. See Sharpley v. Louth & E. Coast Ry. Co., 2 Ch. D. 675-77, 684 (C.A.
1876). In this particular case, the relevant shareholder was a local activist
who strongly supported the construction of seventeen miles of railway to link
the town to nearby places. Sufficient funding could not be raised. Id. at 663-
64. Subsequently, he supported a shorter link, which eventually failed as
well. Id. at 666-67.
168. Id. at 685.
169. 23 Ch. D. 413 (C.A. 1883).
170. See id. at 434.
171. See id. at 432.
172. Id. at 434.
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based on fraud? In 1896, the House of Lords argued that a
shareholder who was not aware of fraud but discovered it
when the company charged him with payment for shares to
which he had subscribed could rescind. 173 He could even wait
until the company sued him before he declared rescission.1
74
The cases demonstrate that affirmation of contracts devel-
oped a new meaning in the context of the relation between
shareholders and corporations. Courts decided these cases on
the basis of established legal principles. They changed law at
the margin, but each new solution eventually gave rise to new
litigation, as private actors tested the limits of the law or new
developments questioned the scope of its applicability.
c. Rescission of Contract and Creditor Rights
Where rescission was possible and no affirmative action
had been taken, shareholders could still lose their right to re-
scind to creditors of the company. Obviously, shareholders'
requests to have their money returned or to be relieved of the
obligation to pay the full amount to which they had subscribed
always were a potential risk for creditors. Yet this was a logical
result from the recognition of the concept of limited liability,
which was enshrined in the law in 1855.175 Creditors had
claims against the corporation, not directly against sharehold-
ers. But did this enable shareholders to rescind their contracts
after the firm had become insolvent, entered into bankruptcy,
or was liquidated? Courts were called upon to specify the
meaning of this highly incomplete law and to determine the
rights of shareholders against those of creditors.
In Oakes v. Turquand,176 the court ruled that once credi-
tors proceeded to enforce their claims against the corporation
by filing for bankruptcy, shareholders had to fulfill their re-
sponsibilities. 177 Shareholders lost their rights to rescind
173. See Aaron's Reefs, Ltd. v. Twiss, [1896] A.C. 290-91 (1896) (appeal
taken from Ir.).
174. See id. at 293.
175. Limited Liability Act, supra note 150; see Pistor et al., The Evolution of
Corporate Law, supra note 62, at 807.
176. 2 L.R.-E. & I. App. 325 (1867).
177. See id. at 352-53. Interestingly, the court itself notes the challenge
posed to the law by these new companies. Lord Cranworth plainly stated
that "[w]hen it became the habit and interest of persons engaged in com-
merce to unite in great numbers for carrying on any particular trade, it soon
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against the corporation. 178 The converse question-whether
shareholders retained their right to rescind until the filing of
bankruptcy-remained subject to further litigation. In 1879,
the court indicated that the formal commencement of liquida-
tion procedures was not required and that insolvency was suffi-
cient.1 79 The issue arose when a shareholder commenced pro-
ceedings to rescind his contract prior to the beginning of liq-
uidation procedures but only after the company had become
insolvent. In the eyes of the court, it was not the formal initia-
tion of the procedure that was crucial but the fact that after
the company became insolvent, the assumption of new liabili-
ties was an issue for the creditors, not the company. 8°1 How-
ever, in a case where a shareholder filed an affidavit stating his
intention to file a counterclaim before the bankruptcy of the
company was initiated, it did not matter that rescission was de-
clared formally only after the commencement of liquida-
tion. 18 1
d. Summary
The basic principles of contract law date back centuries,
but the scope of their applicability has changed over time. Dif-
ferences in the nature of assets or the types of transaction
render existing law incomplete. The development of securi-
ties markets created new challenges for contract law (e.g.,
much more serious information problems and much more liq-
uid markets) and questioned the allocation of risks, rights, and
responsibilities that had been developed for different types of
transactions. As the cases discussed above show, courts proved
quite capable of adapting existing legal principles to the
changing environment, but they did not succeed in creating
became evident that the ordinary provisions of the laws of this country were
ill adapted to the business of such bodies." Id. at 358.
178. Id.
179. See Tennent v. The City of Glasgow Bank, 4 App. Cas. 622 (1879)
(appeal taken from Scot.).
180. Id. However, the court refrained from establishing any general rules
and limited its holding to the facts of the case at hand. There, the company
directors indicated that they would initiate the liquidation procedures volun-
tarily, so although the creditors could have initiated it, they did not. At this
point, the shareholder lost his right.
181. See In re Gen. Ry. Syndicate (Whiteley's Case), [1900] 1 Ch. D. 368-69(C.A. 1900).
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complete law, as each solution created new questions. In fact,
not infrequently, courts broadened the scope of existing con-
tract law principles to encompass cases where victims would
otherwise be left without a remedy. Once courts accepted that
caveat emptor did not block contractual remedies where the de-
fendant acted fraudulently, the door opened for further chal-
lenges to the doctrine. Similarly, while courts held that only
bankruptcy would stand in the way of rescission claims, the
case of insolvency was still undecided. It also became apparent
that contract law did not offer significant remedies for buyers
of securities. Liquid markets in securities often meant that by
the time the buyer of securities discovered a problem, the arti-
cle had changed hands several times. As a result, the current
holder often was not in privity with the original seller and so
did not have a contractual claim against the person responsi-
ble for the misrepresentation-i.e., the corporation, its direc-
tors, or promoters. Moreover, the high turnover of companies
entering and quickly exiting the market' 8 2 often meant that
contractual claims were worthless by the time the fraud was
discovered. Many claimants therefore chose to base their
claims on tort, suing companies, their directors, and promot-
ers for deceit.
3. Tort Remedies
Unlike contractual claims, claims based on tort do not re-
quire a direct contractual relation between plaintiff and defen-
dant. Investors who relied on wrong or fraudulent informa-
tion could therefore invoke liability against a broader range of
actors under tort principles. 183 The downside from the
cheated investor's point of view is that the threshold for tort
liability is higher than for contractual claims.18 4 Tort law his-
torically required that the plaintiff prove intent or at least
182. See H. A. Shannon, The Limited Companies of 1866-1883, 4 EcoN. HIST.
REv. 290, 292 (1993). Shannon calculates that of the 6,111 companies regis-
tered as limited liability companies from 1866 to 1874, 1,878, or approxi-
mately 31%, were abortive; from 1875 to 1877, the rate was 33%; from 1878
to 1880, 45%.
183. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 469, at 1370 (2000).
184. JOHN D. CALAMAR & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 9.13, at 326 (4th ed. 1998).
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gross negligence to establish the defendant's liability. 185 More
importantly from the vantage point of incomplete law, the
principles of tort law had developed based on assaults against
property, personal integrity, or life. Existing principles could
be adapted easily to clear cases of embezzlement but did not
fit cases of misrepresentation of information as well. Simply
stated, the evolution of securities markets necessitated the
transition from a tort regime developed for "blue collar" type
actions to one that could address "white collar" type ones.
By the mid-19th century, the basic requirements for a suc-
cessful deceit claim could be summarized by the formula that
"but for" the wrongful information, the other party would not
have entered into the contractual arrangement. 8 6 This
formula was, however, of little help in determining how much
weight would be given to the fraudulent information, which
could be the sole, primary, or one of many causes that led to
the acquisition of shares. Would any mistake, including mis-
judgments about future developments in the prospectus, give
rise to liability? What was required to establish intent by the
seller: Must he have positively known that the information was
objectively false? What if he believed that the information was
true, though this belief might have been unreasonable? And
finally, would buyers on the secondary market have a claim
based on tort if they bought securities relying on the prospec-
tus disseminated for the initial public offering?
Tort law as it existed prior to the development of securi-
ties markets did not offer clear-cut answers to most of these
questions and was thus highly incomplete.
a. Misrepresentation of Information
A prospectus was the instrument used by companies and
their promoters to attract investors. It was used both to pro-
vide information about the investment project and as a tool
for advertising. Since 1844, companies wishing to issue shares
185. See, e.g., THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THEORY AND PRINCIPLES OF TORT 11
(1906) (noting that actual intent was required for a successful assault claim).
186. See Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst
Change, 39 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 407-09 (1995).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
20031
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
to the public have been required to publish a prospectus, but
the law was initially silent on the contents of this document.1 87
In 1867, a shareholder launched a lawsuit against a com-
pany and its directors, claiming that he had been misled by a
provision in the prospectus stating that the directors and their
friends had acquired large proportions of shares in the com-
pany. In fact, none of them had taken a substantial stake. 88
The shareholder argued that he had relied on this statement
when subscribing to shares in the company, which meanwhile
had been liquidated. 8 9 An important question in this case
was whether the information about the stakes held by directors
and their friends was material to the transaction. The court
stated that it was, without giving much guidance as to how to
distinguish between information that was material and infor-
mation that was not.' 90 Obviously, materiality is a highly in-
complete concept, the applicability of which can hardly be de-
termined absent detailed knowledge of a specific case. This
decision implied that residual lawmaking powers were best al-
located to an agent-such as a court-capable of exercising
residual lawmaking powers after the facts have become known.
In another case the same year, the question arose of
whether the omission of information could constitute de-
ceit.' 9 ' The company in question had failed to disclose to po-
tential investors a deed from which it inherited a huge liability
from its legal predecessor.19 2 While the court determined that
the omission of material fact could amount to a misrepresenta-
tion of information, 93 the company had already entered the
liquidation phase, and the court denied recovery for the share-
holders in favor of creditors.1 94 Under the existing statutes,
the shareholders had not discovered the fraud until it was too
late. In response to this case, the Companies Act (CA) was
187. An Act for the Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation of Joint
Stock Companies, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 § 4 (Eng.).
188. See Henderson v. Lacon, 5 L.R.-Eq. 249, 251-52, 257-58 (1867).
189. Id. at 251-52.
190. Id. at 261-62.
191. See In re Overend, Gurney & Co., 3 L.R. 620-22 (L.R.-Eq. 1867). For
criminal law, the same question was addressed in The King v. Kylsant (Lord), 1
K.B. 442, 448-49 (C.A. 1931). See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
192. See 3 L.R. at 619.
193. Id. at 624-25.
194. Id. at 633.
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amended and a provision inserted to require that a prospectus
soliciting shareholders "shall specify the Dates and the Names
of the Parties to any Contract entered into by the Company, or
the Promoters, Directors, or Trustees thereof... and any Pro-
spectus or Notice not specifying the same shall be deemed
fraudulent .... ,,195 The provision, however, had relatively lit-
tle effect. 19 6 It could not possibly improve information trans-
parency. Listing all contracts was more likely to confuse inves-
tors and certainly did not ensure that they would be able to
identify which contracts were potentially harmful to their in-
terests. Moreover, listing the dates and names of the parties to
the contracts did not reveal their contents. A more specific
regulation of items requiring disclosure in a prospectus can be
found in the revised CA of 1900.197 The law still required that
contracts be listed but excluded contracts carried out in the
ordinary course of business or those concluded more than
three years prior to the publication of the prospectus. 9 8 Com-
panies were also required to state a place and time where these
contracts could be examined. l99 These revisions reflect at-
tempts by lawmakers to specify disclosure requirements and
thereby enhance the completeness of law regulating misrepre-
sentation of information. They also demonstrate the sharp
learning curve for lawmakers, who were continually caught
short by new developments that resulted from legislative re-
sponses and highlighted the incompleteness of the law. By the
time the CA was revised in 1928 (consolidated in 1929),200 a
detailed schedule listing the items that needed to be disclosed
in a prospectus was included in the law.201 In sum, by the late
195. An Act to Amend "The Companies Act, 1862," 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.
131, § 38 (Eng.); see Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1063 (1995) [hereinafter Mahoney,
Mandatory Disclosure] (discussing the legislative response to In re Overend,
Gurney, & Co.).
196. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 6 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter Loss & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS].
197. 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 10(1) (Eng.). The items that required disclo-
sure included the memorandum of association, § 10(1)(a), the number of
shares, § 10(1) (b), and the names, descriptions, and addresses of directors
and proposed directors, § 10(1)(c), among others.
198. Id. § 10(k).
199. Id.
200. The Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23 (Eng.).
201. Id. at§35(1).
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1920s a comprehensive system of extensive ex ante disclosure
rules, stipulated in the Companies Act and combined with re-
active enforcement by the courts, had been established.
Not every misstatement gave rise to an action under ex-
isting case law-only those designed to induce investors to
buy. The difficulty of determining causality between misrepre-
sentation in the prospectus and harm suffered by an acquirer
of shares is illustrated by another case. 202 The prospectus of a
company invited subscriptions for debentures. It stated that
the money was intended for alterations in the buildings of the
company, to purchase horses and vans, and to develop the
trade of the company, whereas, in fact, the money was in-
tended to cover existing liabilities.2 0 3 The court held that this
statement induced investors to believe that the debentures
would be a charge on the property and, since this was not the
case, held the directors to be liable. 20 4 The trial court, whose
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, used this case to
summarize the major elements of an action based on deceit.
First, the prospectus must include not only "a mere statement
of possibility, or of a contingency, or of an intention as to what
might occur according to the person who is making the state-
ment, but there must be something which amounts in the
opinion of the Judge or jury .. . to a statement of a fact as
existing which is not in truth existing."20 5 The rather ambigu-
ous phrasing demonstrates how difficult it was for judges to
draw the line between facts and opinion. Second, the state-
ment must have been made fraudulently. Fraudulent action,
according to the court, did not require the willful telling of a
lie. It was deemed sufficient that a person make factual state-
ments "recklessly, and so to speak, in a gambling spirit" and
willfully abstain from making additional inquiries, thereby en-
dorsing a statement without which investors would not have
parted from their money.20 6
This definition of fraudulent behavior is quite narrow. By
requiring recklessness, the court implied that there was no 1ia-
202. See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459 (C.A. 1885).
203. See id. at 459-61.
204. See id. at 484-85.
205. See id. at 465.
206. See id. at 465-66.
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bility for negligent misstatements. 20 7 It is in the context of this
earlier case law that the landmark case of Deny v. Peek,208 de-
cided in 1889, must be assessed. The prospectus of a railway
company stated that approval had been granted by the rele-
vant state authorities to convert an animal powered track into
a steam powered one.2 0 9 In fact, approval had been granted
only for parts of the track. After the company was bankrupt,
the directors were sued for compensation by shareholders who
had lost their money.210 The House of Lords confirmed that
the statement in the prospectus was objectively incorrect. But
it relieved the directors-"five men of good character and con-
duct"-of liability, because they honestly believed in the cor-
rectness of their statement. 21' Without proof of fraud-and
the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff-an action of deceit
could not be maintained. The House of Lords reviewed ear-
lier cases in an attempt to discern general principles of tort
law. It criticized attempts to do justice in individual cases
rather than sticking to principles of established law. 2 12 "It
might, perhaps, be well to enact that in prospectuses of public
companies there should be a warranty of the truth of all state-
ments,"213 but existing law did not include such a provision.
Essentially, the message was that it was not for the courts to fill
this gap and write a more complete law but for the legislature
to do so.
Applying the framework of incomplete law, by unambigu-
ously stating that negligent misrepresentation was not suffi-
cient for establishing fraud, Deny v. Peek specified-and
thereby narrowed-the scope of actions that could give rise to
liability. The law as stated in this decision required a high and
subjective threshold for liability and did not merely circum-
scribe areas that could result in liability. The rationale, ac-
cording to the court, was to avoid discouraging risk-averse peo-
ple from engaging in financial market activities ("[t]he objec-
tion is... to the danger of driving respectable and responsible
207. See id.
208. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
209. The prospectus stated explicitly that "the company has the right to
use steam or mechanical motive power, instead of horses." Id. at 338.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 345.
212. See id. at 352.
213. Id.
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men from being promoters, and of substituting for them those
who are neither ."),214 i.e., to prevent over-enforcement of
the law.
The legislature responded to the court's request for legis-
lative intervention by lowering the threshold for liability
through the Directors' Liability Act (DLA) 215 a year after Deny
v. Peek was decided. Under this Act, directors and company
promoters could be held liable for negligent misrepresenta-
tion of information.2 1 6 The Act stipulates that any untrue
statement in the prospectus or other notice concerning the
issuance of shares gives rise to liability, unless those responsi-
ble for the statement can prove that they had "reasonable
ground to believe, and did up to the time of the allotment of
the shares, debentures, or debenture stock, as the case may be,
believe, that the statement was true.' 217 In effect, the law low-
ered the threshold for liability by shifting the burden of proof
on the issue of whether the defendant had grounds to believe
that the statement was true. Absent such proof, misrepresenta-
tions resulting in injury gave rise to liability. 218 Had the Act
been adopted prior to Deny v. Peek, there is little doubt that
the directors involved would have had to compensate share-
holders.
The threshold for liability was lowered further with the
adoption of the Misrepresentation Act in 1967.219 This Act
does not specifically target securities but deals more generally
with misrepresentation of information. 220 Under its provi-
sions, even innocent misrepresentation can lead to liability,
unless the offender demonstrates that he reasonably believed
in the truthfulness of the information. 221 In terms of this Arti-
cle's conceptual framework, the DILA, and later the Misrepre-
sentation Act, shifted the incompleteness problem from a
Type II to a Type I problem. They thereby signaled to courts
214. Id.
215. Directors' Liability Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64 (Eng.); see Mahoney,
Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 195, at 1088 (noting that Parliament's re-
sponse to Deny was passage of the 1890 Act).
216. Id. § 3.
217. Id. § 3(a).
218. Id. § 3.
219. Misrepresentation Act, 1967, c. 7 (Eng.).
220. Id.
221. Id. § 2(1).
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that the scope of their residual lawmaking powers was more
extensive than previously assumed and included cases that ear-
lier would have been dismissed.
b. Liability to Whom?
Another issue that repeatedly gave rise to litigation was to
whom directors, company promoters, and others responsible
for the contents of the prospectus would be liable. As the
above examples show, the information included in or omitted
from a prospectus is crucial for establishing liability. For ac-
tions based on tort law, a contractual relation with the ac-
quirer of shares was not required. This did not mean, how-
ever, that anyone who relied on the prospectus would have a
claim. In order to establish liability, "there must be something
to connect the directors making the representation with the
party complaining that he has been deceived and injured by
it .... "222 When the plaintiff acquired shares not directly
from the company but on the secondary market, the court
held that the prospectus was issued for the initial public offer-
ing. Absent any direct communication with secondary buyers,
the directors were not liable to those who acquired shares on
the secondary market. 223
This left secondary buyers for the most part without a real
chance for recovery of their losses, since the immediate seller
was not the one who had created or disseminated the fraudu-
lent information. This escape hatch allowed issuers of shares
to develop schemes by which they would target secondary buy-
ers with a prospectus or other information without being held
liable for incorrect information contained therein. Courts
were soon forced to address such schemes, since previous case
law had virtually opened the door for the design of strategies
to circumvent this Type II incomplete law.
In the 1870s, a father and son set up a company to ex-
plore a gold-bearing reef in Transvaal. Investors were invited
to buy shares. The prospectus included information on the
yield of gold from a ton of quartz which was objectively incor-
rect. The plaintiff did not buy shares upon receiving the pro-
spectus. However, a few weeks later, a major newspaper car-
ried an article with the headline "A Big Jump in Sutherland
222. Peek v. Gurney, 6 L.R.-E. & 1. App. 399 (1873).
223. Id. at 410-13.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
20031
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
Reefs," alleging a very rich discovery of gold.224 The plaintiff
then bought shares on the secondary market, basing his deci-
sion on the prospectus-which he had kept-and the good
news reported, only to learn later that the son had initiated
the newspaper article, and it was part of a fraudulent scheme
designed by father and son.22 5 The court distinguished this
case from Peek v. Gurney by holding that the publication of the
prospectus and the instigation of the newspaper article was
part of a comprehensive scheme designed to induce those that
had earlier read the prospectus to buy. 226 It therefore held in
favor of the investor. The definition of what would qualify as a
comprehensive scheme and thus extend the liability of those
responsible for the contents of the prospectus to buyers on the
secondary market, however, was left unqualified. Once again,
case law rendered existing principles less, rather than more,
complete, establishing only some broad guidelines to deline-
ate the scope of liability.
Changes in financial practice over time created questions
about the principle that the prospectus was targeted only at
initial purchasers. In 1996, a case was brought by an investor
who had acquired securities of an unlisted company both in
the initial public offering and subsequently-in a much larger
amount-on the secondary market.227 For both investment
decisions the buyer had relied on the information contained
in the prospectus, which proved to be incorrect. The defen-
dant argued that it could not be held liable for the shares ac-
quired on the secondary market since the prospectus was di-
rected only to initial buyers. Yet the court held for the plain-
tiff, pointing out that commercial practice had changed
substantially over the years. 228 The court's decision explained
that the purpose of a modern prospectus is not merely to in-
duce investors to make purchases during the initial offering,
but also to induce the public to make after-market
purchases. 229 In light of this change in practice, the relation
between the issuer and the secondary buyer consisted of suffi-
cient proximity to establish liability. The decision acknowl-
224. See Andrews v. Mockford, [1896] 1 Q.B. 373 (C.A. 1896).
225. See id. at 374, 377-78.
226. See id. at 381.
227. Possfund Custodian Trustee Ltd. v. Diamond, I W.L.R. 1353 (1996).
228. Id. at 1363.
229. Id.
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edged the principle that there must be a special relation be-
tween plaintiff and defendant in a tort action based on deceit
but greatly expanded the scope of relations that fell into this
category.2 30
c. Summary
Until well into the 19th century, the major category of tort
actions was deeds committed against persons or assets. With
the development of financial markets, words achieved an im-
portance that necessitated a reassessment of the type of actions
that could give rise to tort liability. Courts struggled to bal-
ance the interests of investors in effective legal protection
against the need to limit the scope of liability to avoid suffocat-
ing markets. Courts were also careful to guard well-established
legal principles of tort law against hasty overhaul addressed to
only one segment of the market (securities transactions).
These multiple objectives led to the development of clearer,
more complete case law in only a few cases. More often than
not, courts simply stretched existing principles to encompass
the new cases, thereby blurring lines and creating more in-
complete law. Examples include the acknowledgment that
words could weigh as heavily as deeds; the extension of the
scope of liability to claimants that had acquired securities only
on the secondary market and not in the initial offering; and
the lowering of the threshold for liability from gross negli-
gence to simple negligence. This strategy increased uncer-
tainty about what actions would lead to liability and thus un-
dermined the deterrence effect of the law. An exception to
this rule is Deny v. Peek, a case in which the court rejected the
idea of holding directors liable for negligent misconduct and
deferred the right to make such a decision to the legisla-
ture. 23 1 The legislature did intervene, creating a law substan-
tially broader than existing common law and therefore reduc-
ing Type I incompleteness while increasing Type II.
The case law discussed above is not erroneous or "bad"
law. In each case, courts faced the dilemma of adhering to
well-established legal principles or changing them to fit the
needs of the new types of cases before them. Given the limited
information they possessed about the nature of market trans-
230. Id. at 1363-64.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 208-214.
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actions at the time, their decisions are justifiable. Had courts
been more responsive to changes in the market, legislative in-
tervention may not have been necessary on some occasions.
However, it is doubtful that this would have been sufficient to
ensure effective law enforcement and thereby prevent the
growing need for a proactive law enforcer-the regulator.
B. The Emergence of a Regulator
The above discussion has shown that neither case nor stat-
utory law offers fully satisfactory solutions in this area, which
not only is subject to considerable change over time (and
therefore remains highly incomplete despite efforts to adjust),
but also can produce substantial negative externalities. This
section explores the emergence of regulatory functions in En-
gland. As noted, this Article does not emphasize the nature of
the regulator, i.e., whether it is a private (for example, a stock
exchange) or state actor. It is mainly interested in regulatory
functions, including residual lawmaking and proactive law en-
forcement, which in England have been carried out by both
private and state institutions. The major stock exchange in
England, the London Stock Exchange (LSE), increasingly had
assumed regulatory functions. In addition, the Department of
Trade and Industry was vested with regulatory powers by the
legislature. 232 Recent changes have consolidated regulatory
functions in the Securities and Investment Board (SIB), later
renamed the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which now
regulates, inter alia, the issuance of shares to the public.233
Evidence of the stock exchange's assumption of regula-
tory functions over issuers of securities is available as early as
1827. The minutes of the foreign stock exchange 234 stated
that the exchange's committee in charge of admitting securi-
ties had refused the admission of securities by a foreign state
on the grounds that it was in default on previous obliga-
232. 1 BRITISH COMPANY LAW, AND PRACTICE 1-085 (2003); BRIAN R. CHEF-
FINS, COMPANY LAw: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION 366 & n.9 (1997).
233. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES Au-
THORITY 15 (2001), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fsain-
tro.pdf.
234. The foreign stock exchange subsequently merged with the London
Stock Exchange. See MICHIE, supra note 124, at 57-58.
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tions.23 5 The case demonstrates the exchange's willingness
and capacity to stop actions-the issuance of securities to the
public-which were likely to result in harmful outcome. The
incident, however, remained an isolated event, and general
rules for the admission of securities were not established for
some time. Securities were admitted on an ad hoc basis, with
primary consideration given to the expected liquidity of the
shares and thus to their profitability for members of the ex-
change.2 36
It took some time for the LSE to recognize the role it
needed to play in protecting not only the interests of the ex-
change and its members, but also of the broader investor com-
munity-that in fact, these objectives were linked.23 7 The cru-
cial role of the exchange in protecting investor interests in En-
gland was underlined by the fact that public offerings were
made through the exchange. The two acts-issuance of shares
and listing them on an exchange-were conducted as one,
subjecting virtually all publicly traded companies to the rules
of the exchange. 238 It is therefore not surprising that stock
235. VICTOR E. MORGAN & W.A. THOMAS, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE:
ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS 93 (2d ed. 1969).
236. See MICHIE, supra note 124, at 83-84.
237. See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 60, at 37, 39-44.
The LSE was much less proactive than the NYSE in developing into a regula-
tory agent by exercising proactive law enforcement and ex ante lawmaking
powers. Coffee relates these differences to the structures of the exchanges,
id. at 37, 39-40, their rules on membership, id. at 37, and the competition
they faced in their respective markets, id.
238. This practice is in marked contrast to the practice in continental Eu-
rope and the U.S. In continental European countries, listing is separate
from the public issuance of shares. In fact, France and Germany require
that shares be placed before the company can be registered-although it is
of course possible to place the shares among a smaller circle of shareholders
and disseminate them more widely through a subsequent increase in capital
and secondary offering, or for the original shareholders to sell them after
the company has been established. See Friedrich Kessler, The American Securi-
ties Act and its Foreign Counterparts: A Comparative Study, 44 Yale L.J. 1133,
1136 (1935). The major difference between the U.S. and England is that in
the U.S. many companies are traded over-the-counter rather than on an offi-
cial exchange. See L. C. B. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American
Corporation Law, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1369, 1381 (1956). For an analysis of the
differences in issuance between continental Europe and the U.S., see Kess-
ler, supra, at 1136-55. For a comparison of British and American laws gov-
erning initial public offerings after the adoption of the Securities and Ex-
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exchanges regularly were blamed for stock market scandals. 239
This practice may help explain why regulation exclusively by
the stock exchange rather than a state regulator survived in
England for much longer than in the U.S. It also became in-
creasingly clear that the quality of the securities traded af-
fected the business of the exchange and its members.
Towards the end of the 19th century, the LSE developed
some screening devices, primarily in the form of disclosure re-
quirements. These requirements were minor by today's stan-
dards but exceeded the requirements of existing law at the
time.240 The rules required the submission of a copy of the
prospectus and a statutory declaration stating the amount of
stock allotted to the general public, the amount paid up, and a
confirmation that the securities were ready to be issued. In
the case of new companies, a statement of capital and the
nominal value of shares had to be submitted. 24 1 Only compa-
nies that complied with these requirements would be quoted
on the exchange.
Initially, the exchange did not have much capacity to en-
gage in continuous monitoring. However, it reconsidered its
law enforcement role in the 1930s. By that time, the market
for domestic corporate securities had become the exchange's
core market; by 1928-29, the exchange's disclosure require-
ments surpassed those of statutory law. 242 Nevertheless, inves-
tor confidence was failing in the wake of widespread share-
pushing schemes in the early 1930s, which neither the law nor
the exchange's regulations had been able to prevent. The LSE
change Act in the U.S., see John Hanna & Edgar Turlington, The Securities
Act of 1933, 7 S. CAL. L. REv. 18 (1934).
239. The attitudes of the public at large about stock exchanges in mid-
19th century England are well-captured in STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN
SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS (1998). For a crit-
ical review of this book, see Paul G. Mahoney, The Pernicious Art of Securities
Regulation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1373 (1999) [hereinafter Mahoney, The Perni-
cious Art].
240. The first comprehensive set of disclosure rules were incorporated in
the English CA in 1900. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
241. MORGAN & THOMAS, supra note 235, at 152-53. By contrast, Michie
argues that the LSE did not assume this type of power before the end of
World War I, when state pressure became an important factor in inducing
the exchange to assume regulatory powers on its own rather than accepting
state regulation. See MICHIE, supra note 124, at 266-68.
242. See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 60, at 43.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 35:931
INCOMPLETE LAW
came under increasing pressure to either improve its regula-
tory regime or face more extensive state intervention .24 3 The
LSE reacted by imposing more stringent disclosure require-
ments and enhancing its capacity to screen the information
that was submitted.2 44 That this amounted to an improvement
of the exchange's regulatory capabilities was recognized by the
1948 revision of the Companies Act,245 which established the
most extensive legal disclosure requirements under English
law thus far.2 46 Notably, however, the revision exempted com-
panies that had made adequate disclosure under the ex-
change's rules, 2 4 7 a clear indication that lawmakers were satis-
fied with the exchange's activities.
After 1948, the LSE further extended its role as regulator,
requiring the submission of audited financial statements. 248
In addition, after 1954 disclosure of directors' remuneration
was required, and after 1965, semi-annual reports. 249 To en-
sure the accuracy of information submitted, the exchange re-
lied extensively on intermediaries such as issuing houses, spon-
soring brokers, and professional auditing bodies.25°1 In addi-
tion, through its own Quotations Department, the LSE
reviewed the information submitted and on this basis ap-
proved or disapproved securities' quotations25 '-a proactive
law enforcement function. The benchmark for the Quota-
tions Department remains not simply a list of detailed items
but a broad-in the terms of this Article, highly incomplete-
rule that requires companies to submit all information neces-
sary for investors to make an informed judgment.252 The ex-
243. MICHIE, supra note 124, at 261-63, 265.
244. Id. at 265-68.
245. 11 & 12 Geo 6, c. 38 (Eng.).
246. See id. §§ 37-46 (listing disclosure requirements).
247. See id. § 39.
248. Initially, financial statements for the past ten years had to be dis-
closed. In 1973, this was reduced to five years. See BENSTON, supra note 64,
at 27. Today, three audited financial statements for a period of only three
years is sufficient. See London Stock Exchange Listing Rules § 6(e)(4)
(2002), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/chapt6-3.pdf.
249. BENSTON, supra note 64, at 27.
250. Id. For a review of the self-regulatory framework and its limits, see
L.C.B. GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION (1982).
251. BENSTON, supra note 64, at 27.
252. As of April 2002, the Admission and Disclosure Standards of the LSE
include a provision that issuers must comply with all provisions set forth in
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change thereby reserves the right to make more tailored re-
quests of information from specific companies. The LSE con-
tinues to change its disclosure requirements, in marked
contrast to the statutory legal framework which hardly
changed after 1948.253
The only agent that functioned as a state regulator of issu-
ers prior to the Big Bang reforms of 1986 was the Board of
Trade (BT) (later the Department of Trade and Industry,
DTI). The 1948 CA explicitly allocated to the BT the power to
initiate investigations, request books and information from
corporate directors, and bring proceedings in the name and
on behalf of shareholders. 254 The BT had the power to adapt
the disclosure requirements stipulated in the law, i.e., to exer-
cise residual lawmaking powers over these issues. 255 Important
strings were attached, however, namely that these regulations
could not "render more onerous the requirements" stipulated
in the law. 256 This provision substantially restricted the BT's
residual lawmaking powers. Perhaps not surprisingly in light
of these constraints, the DTI did not develop into an active
regulator. It did not publish detailed rules and regulations re-
garding disclosure requirements, nor did it routinely examine
reports that companies submitted. The only cases in which
the BT took action were those in which injury had resulted
from fraud or misfeasance. 257 In other words, the BT adopted
a passive and primarily reactive enforcement policy.
The Big Bang reforms of 1986 constituted a major over-
haul of the system of financial market regulation in the U.K.
by establishing a state regulator for financial markets. Never-
theless, the exchange's jurisdiction over newly issued shares to
the public was not fundamentally altered. Part IV of the 1986
Financial Services Act (FSAct) on "official listing of securities"
the "Standards" of the exchange. London Stock Exchange, Admission and
Disclosure Standards § 3.1 (2002). However, the exchange "may [also]
make additions to, dispense with or modify the application of the Standards
(either unconditionally or subject to conditions) in such cases and by refer-
ence to such circumstances as it considers appropriate." Id. § 3.2.
253. For a critique of this statutory framework, see GOWER, supra note 250,
3.12, at 21.
254. 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, §§ 165(b)-169.
255. Id. § 454(l).
256. Id. § 454(3).
257. BENSTON, supra note 64, at 23.
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explicitly designates the Council of the Stock Exchange as the
"competent authority" for this part of the Act.258 This jurisdic-
tion extended not only to securities traded on the official ex-
change, but also to securities admitted to alternative trading
systems and those that were to be placed on markets of other
E.U. member states. 259
To be sure, the fact that the FSAct explicitly delegated
regulatory functions to the stock exchange marked a change
in the history of financial market regulation. Whereas previ-
ously the stock exchange exercised rulemaking autonomously,
it now carried out this function on behalf of and under the
supervision of the state regulator. The state's role was further
strengthened with the adoption of the Financial Services and
Market Act (FSMA) in 2000.260 The new law took away much
of the power that had been delegated to the exchange under
the 1986 law. The authority to define listing standards and
approve the issuance of shares moved from the exchange to a
state agency, the Financial Services Authority (FSA).261 The
shift from self-regulation to state regulation had many causes,
of which the effectiveness of the LSE as lawmaker and law en-
forcer is only one. This Article does not seek to explain the
timing of this shift and leaves a closer investigation of the pros
and cons of self- and state regulation to future work. However,
it is worth noting that this enlarged role of state regulators and
greater division of labor between self- and state regulators was
258. Financial Services Act 1986, c. 60 § 142 (Eng.) (amended in 1991 and
repealed in 2001).
259. The latter was accomplished by the incorporation of the E.U. Coun-
cil Directive 89/298/EEC into English law. See Public Offers of Securities
Regulations, (1995) S1 1995/1537 (incorporating Council Directive 89/298/
EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8). Since England had only a small over-the-counter
trade and issuance of shares and listing were usually accomplished in one
step, it lacked a "competent" authority for stocks not listed in England. For
details on the realization of the directive in England, see VANESSA EDWARDS,
EC CoMPANY LAW 266-75 (1999); Simon Gleeson & Harold S. Bloomenthal,
The Public Offer of Securities in the United Kingdom, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
359, 366-77 (1999).
260. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 (Eng.); see ALISTAIR AL-
COCK, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS Act 2000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
LAW 31-32 (2000).
261. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 74.
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in line with developments in other highly industrialized coun-
tries, most notably the U.S.262
The history of financial market regulation in England ex-
emplifies that without a responsive and proactive LMLE agent,
legislatures and courts could not make and enforce law effi-
ciently. Flexibility of the rules determining under what condi-
tions companies could issue shares to the public was crucial in
order to keep up with market developments at home and
abroad. While statutory lawmakers made some remarkable
progress in enhancing disclosure rules in 1928-29 and 1948 in
particular, over the next decades the legislature again fell be-
hind market developments and left the field to the ex-
change. 263 With regard to law enforcement, it was apparent
even in the 19th century that law enforcement by courts exclu-
sively was insufficient. The amount of injury caused by harm-
ful actions, not only to the immediate parties concerned (i.e.,
shareholders of a particular company) but also to investors at
large and to the reputation of financial markets, were evidence
of serious under-enforcement problems. 264 The LSE may have
assumed more extensive regulatory functions only reluctantly.
It is in fact likely that-fearing the loss of companies to com-
petitive exchanges-it would have further delayed this process
had the government not threatened legislative intervention,
which the exchange preempted by developing its own regula-
tory capacity.2 65 The main point, however, is that regulatory
functions were taken up by the exchange in response to the
problem of existing law's under-deterrence and the resulting
widespread violations of investors' rights.
V. INCOMPLETENESS OF THE LAW IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
England is not the only country that struggled with the
problem of law enforcement in an area in which constant
change tended to render laws highly incomplete. Other coun-
tries faced similar problems. A more detailed comparison of
responses to the problem of incompleteness of financial mar-
ket law is beyond the scope of this Article. A brief summary of
262. See discussion infra Part V.A.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 242-253.
264. See supra Part IV.A.
265. See supra notes 237-247 and accompanying text.
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the experiences of the United States and Germany, however,
will demonstrate, first, that effective regulatory functions
(proactive law enforcement combined with flexible lawmak-
ing) emerged in different countries in response to similar
problems and, second, that misallocation of lawmaking and
law enforcement powers may influence the development of fi-
nancial markets in the long term.
A. United States
The general legal provisions dealing with misrepresenta-
tion of information in the United States were similar to those
of the U.K. prior to the Director's Liability Act of 1890.266 As
in the U.K., case law increasingly revealed the limitations of
these principles in ensuring effective law enforcement in fi-
nancial markets where asymmetry of information was endemic
and rapid economic change suggested high levels of incom-
pleteness of the law.
Nevertheless, courts did not feel compelled to develop
principles to mimic English statutory law. Although the "cita-
del of privity of contracts" was somewhat eroded by the late
1920s, American courts refused to hold directors, company
promoters, or accountants liable for negligent misrepresenta-
tion of information. 267 In fact, courts extensively cited Deny vs.
Peek,268 the decision that had triggered the passage of Direc-
tor's Liability Act in the U.K. 269
As late as 1931, the Court of Appeals of New York held
that negligence was reserved for contractual relations between
the defendant and the plaintiff or required at least a duty on
the part of the defendant "to act with the same care that would
have been due under a contract of employment."270 Negli-
266. See discussion supra Part W.A.
267. See, e.g., Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783, 783 (Pa. 1919); Crouch v.
Gray, 290 S.W. 391, 395 (Tenn. 1926).
268. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
269. See, e.g., Sharkey v. Burlingame Co., 282 P. 546, 550 (Or. 1929) (quot-
ing Deny in discussion of elements necessary for a successful deceit claim).
See supra note 215 and accompanying text for information on the passage of
the Directors' Liability Act in the U.K.
270. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). U/-
tramares addressed the question of whether an accounting firm should be
held liable for certifying accounts that had been forged. While it was posi-
tively ruled that the accountants did not know about the fraudulent action, it
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gence was not sufficient for tort liability where deceit alone
was alleged.271
In part, the problem of under-enforcement that resulted
from the incompleteness of law was mitigated by the stock ex-
changes' assumption of extensive proactive law enforcement
powers. In the U.S., the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
formally established in 1817, quickly emerged as dominant. 272
The original constitutive acts regulated members and traders.
As early as 1853, however, the exchange stipulated require-
ments for companies that wished to be listed on the exchange.
These companies had to provide complete statements of
shares outstanding and capital resources. 273 In 1869, a rule
was introduced that required all shares be registered with a
bank or other appropriate institution.274 In 1895, NYSE rec-
ommended, but did not mandate, that all companies submit
annual reports with income statements and balance sheets. 2 75
In 1923, it established a fraud bureau,276 and in 1926 it tight-
was equally clear that they had made no attempt to verify changes in the
books that were included by hand after the books had already been closed.
Id. at 443. The same court had ruled earlier that in product liability cases
negligent conduct might suffice for liability. Id. at 445. Yet it felt compelled
to distinguish those cases where "what is released or set in motion is a physi-
cal force" from cases where only "words, written or oral" will be released to
third parties. Id. In other words, although the accountants were clearly neg-
ligent and knew that their reports would be transmitted to third parties such
as creditors, since they did not have a direct contractual relationship with
those creditors, they would not be held liable. "[N]egligence alone is not a
substitute for fraud." Id. at 447. This principle limited liability for misrepre-
sentation of information more generally, including the issuance of securi-
ties. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1937).
271. See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 447.
272. ROBERT SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK
MARKET 30 (1965).
273. Compare this with the LSE, which began to play a role as proactive
law enforcer only at the end of the 19th century. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 234-241. For a more detailed comparison of NYSE and LSE, see
Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 60, at 3444.
274. See PETER WYCKOFF, WALL STREET AND THE STOCK MARKETS 22 (1972).
275. J. Robert Brown,Jr. & Stephen M. DeTore, Rationalizing the Disclosure
Process: The Summary Annual Report, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 39, 44 (1988-
1989).
276. See New York Stock Exchange, About the NYSE: Timeline, at http://
www.nyse.com (last accessed Nov. 29, 2003) (on file with the Journal of Inter-
national Law and Politics).
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ened listing requirements, encouraging companies to give
equal voting rights to shareholders. 277
These attempts to develop a set of rules and proactive en-
forcement devices aimed at protecting shareholders protected
only investors of companies listed on NYSE. 278 Realizing the
limits of its own regulation as well as the competition from
other exchanges, NYSE supported the enactment of the fed-
eral securities regulations in 1933 and 1934.279 Since then it
has focused its efforts on continuous disclosure over initial of-
ferings of shares, which are covered by the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Securities Act (SA). 280
From the vantage point of the theory of incomplete law,
the most important contribution of the 1933-34 securities reg-
ulations was the creation of a regulator (the SEC) that com-
bined ex ante rulemaking with proactive enforcement powers,
including the right to monitor, investigate, enjoin actions, im-
pose fines, or seek court sanctions. 28 1
Individual states had addressed the problem of stock
fraud for over two decades already. By 1933, 47 states and Ha-
waii had adopted so-called "blue sky laws," which included reg-
ulations for persons or entities wishing to sell securities to
their residents. 282 Most states introduced registration require-
ments for securities issued and/or traded within its jurisdic-
tion, allowing screening of issuers and proactive enforcement
of laws through entry requirements. 283 Thirty-eight of the
states also revised and extended their anti-fraud provisions.28 4
The most sweeping definition of fraudulent behavior can be
found in New York's Martin Act of 1921 (§ 352).285
277. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687, 697 (1985)
[hereinafter Seligman, Equal Protection].
278. Seligman, Historical Need, supra note 67, at 15.
279. Id. at 55.
280. 15 U.S.C. § 77f-77h (2000).
281. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 78u.
282. Louis Loss & EDWARD M. CoWETr, BLUE SKy LAw 17 (1958).
283. LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAwS 14-15
(1995).
284. Loss & CowETr, supra note 282, at 25.
285. Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352 (McKinney 1996); see Loss &
CowrEr, supra note 282, at 24 (discussing courts' broad interpretation of
fraud under the act). Essentially, any action that had the appearance of fic-
tion, deception, or fraud could trigger intervention by the Attorney General.
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Federal regulators faced a choice among different regula-
tory philosophies. One possibility was to follow the New York
example and rely primarily on reactive enforcement of anti-
fraud provisions. 286 The other was to expand proactive law en-
forcement, which was the option chosen. 287 The core provi-
sion of the SA is that the distribution of any security is unlaw-
ful unless it has been registered 28 8 and is accompanied by a
prospectus that meets the other requirements stipulated in the
act.28 9 The definition of what constitutes a security under the
act is very comprehensive. 290 The registration requirement is
not equivalent to approval power, which would be the clearest
§ 352(1). He could investigate, subpoena witnesses, and require the submis-
sion of books and paper. § 352(2). Failure to comply with a subpoena was
deemed a misdemeanor. § 352(4)-(5). In addition, the Attorney General
had the right to enjoin either a violation of the act or the sale of securities by
the defendant in any capacity within the state. § 353(1). Violation of any
injunction could be penalized with a fine of U.S. $3000. § 359-g(l).
286. Loss & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 196, at 28.
287. The 1933 Securities Act (SA) is concerned primarily with the initial
distribution of securities. The Federal Trade Commission (F1C), estab-
lished in 1914, was initially charged with enforcing the SA. See Louis Loss &
JOEL SELIGMAN, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 285 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
Loss & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION]. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was established only by the Securities Exchange Act
(SEA) of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). The SEC today administers five other
statues: the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2000),
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000), the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2000), the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000), and the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78111 (2000). See also Loss
& SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra, at 226.
288. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1997).
289. Id. § 77e(b).
290. See id. § 77b(a)(1). The definition is as follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privi-
lege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into
on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or,
in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "secur-
ity," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
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form of proactive enforcement. Still, the SEC can use its pow-
ers to delay or even stop the issuance of securities at the regis-
tration stage.291
The SEC also exercises extensive residual lawmaking pow-
ers. These powers allow the SEC to regularly "make, amend,
or rescind" those rules it deems necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of the law, "including rules and regulations governing
registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of
securities and issuers, and defining accounting, technical and
trade terms" under the Act. 292 In order to ensure compliance
with these rules and the provisions of the law, the SEC is vested
with proactive enforcement powers. In particular, the SEC
may administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses,
take evidence, and demand the production of books, papers,
or other documents which it deems relevant or material to in-
quiry.29 3 These proactive enforcement powers are comple-
mented with the right to initiate formal proceedings for a stop
order and to initiate court proceedings, including preliminary
injunctions to enjoin actions. 294
This brief overview shows that the U.S. did not follow the
English example of gradually adapting liability rules long
before moving to a system of regulation. Unlike England,
American states' law had never regulated information disclo-
sure to shareholders or investors, other than the right to re-
quest information. As described above, England gradually re-
quired that more and more items be disclosed and linked lia-
bility to compliance with disclosure provisions in the CA. 29
5
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id. See also § 77ddd(d) (indicating that the SEC may exempt "any security"
from the provisions of the Act).
291. Id. § 77h(e).
292. Id. § 77s(a).
293. Id. § 77s(b).
294. Id. §§ 77h(e), t(b).
295. In France, audited annual reports to shareholders were mandatory as
early as 1867, according to the French commercial code, and in Germany as
early as 1861. Norbert Horn, Aktienrechtliche Unternehmensorganisation in der
Hochindustrialisierung (1860-1920): Deutschland, England, Frankreich und die
USA im Vergleich [Enterprise Organization in the Securities Law of High Industriali-
zation (1860-1920): Germany, France and the USA in Comparison], in RECHT UND
ENTWICKLUNG DER GROI3UNTERINEHMEN IM 19. UND FRUHEN 20. JAHRHUNDERT
[LAW AND THE FORMATION OF THE BIG ENTERPRISES IN THE 19TH AND 20TH
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When the scope of possible harm that could result from mis-
informed investors became apparent, the U.S. in effect at-
tempted to skip this process of trial and error by immediately
moving toward a system based on proactive enforcement. 296
But trial and error did take place in the U.S. The states' ex-
perimentation with blue sky laws and the history of NYSE offer
important insights into the benefits of a system that offered
not only reactive but also proactive enforcement. The timing
of the establishment of a financial market regulator was most
likely influenced by political factors. However, the fact that
both stock exchanges and the majority of state legislators rec-
ognized the need for a different allocation of residual lawmak-
ing and law enforcement powers suggests that political factors
were not alone in triggering the emergence of a regulator for
financial markets.
A similar case can be made for the current proposal to
create a regulator for auditors. Auditors were among the few
financial intermediaries left out of the securities regulations
put in place in the 1930s and early 1940s. To this date, they
are largely self-regulated. 297 Self-regulation, however, proved
ineffective in preventing auditing firms from taking responsi-
bilities as consultants, which increasingly resulted in conflict of
interest problems. 298 Moreover, existing criminal sanctions
for misstatement of information in reports were ineffective in
deterring companies such as Enron, Worldcom, and others
from grossly misleading investors about companies' values and
the amounts of their earnings. 299 Against this background, the
CENTURIES] 123, 128 (40 Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft [Criti-
cal Studies in History], Norbert Horn &Jrgen Kocka eds., 1979).
296. Note that there is still a substantial debate about the causal relation
between stock fraud and the market crash of 1929. See Romano, supra note
65, at 2382-83.
297. See BENSTON, supra note 64, at 33.
298. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., THE ACQUIESCENT GATEKEEPER: REPUTATIONAL
INTERMEDIARIES, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF ACCOUNT-
ING 15 (Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies, Work-
ing Paper No. 191, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?
abstractid=270944.
299. See The Enron Debacle and Gatekeeper Liability: Why Would the Gatekeepers
Remain Silent?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp.,
106th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Pro-
fessor of Law, Columbia University Law School), available at http://com-
merce.senate.gov/hearings/I 21801Coffee.pdf.
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proposal to establish a new regulator for auditors and auditing
firms and to enforce law proactively so as to prevent actions
that may result in substantial harm is not only a plausible ap-
proach, but one that might be more effective than raising the
level of punishment in the hope of deterring similar actions in
the future. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002300 combines dif-
ferent approaches to lawmaking and the allocation of LMLEP.
This may stem as much from political compromise as from a
lack of understanding of the tradeoffs required by these differ-
ent mechanisms. This Article's theory suggests that the alloca-
tion of lawmaking and law enforcement powers to a body that
can perform regulatory functions and take proactive measures
against potentially harmful actions will be more effective than
increased criminal sanctions. While the latter may send sig-
nals to the public at large, the former will be more effective in
ensuring that the law actually will be enforced. An important
condition, of course, is that this regulatory body have the polit-
ical stature and independence to live up to its task.3 0'
B. Germany
A similar general trend in devising alternative enforce-
ment mechanisms in other countries can be observed. Com-
300. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed by President George W. Bush on
July 30, 2002. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002).
301. Unfortunately, the track record of the new accounting industry over-
sight board has not been very positive in this regard. The first chair ap-
pointed to the body, William Webster, resigned on November 12, 2002, only
days after Harvey Pitt, the former chairman of the SEC, resigned his post.
Press Release, SEC, SEC Accepts Resignation of Judge Webster (Nov. 12,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-159.htm; Jeanne
Cummings et al., Rapid Exit: SEC's Pitt Resigns Amid Controversy Over Webster
Job, WALL ST.J., Nov. 6, 2002, at A4. Pitt's resignation has been linked to his
support for Webster's candidacy and appointment to the accounting indus-
try oversight board, despite the fact that he knew that Webster had headed
the board of directors' auditing committees at U.S. Technology, a company
that was facing investor suits for alleged accounting fraud, and Pitt did not
report these facts nor his knowledge of these facts to the other commission-
ers. Cummings, supra, at A4. On May 21, 2003, the SEC appointed William
J. McDonough to be chair of the body. Press Release, SEC, SEC Unani-
mously Approves William J. McDonough as Chairman of Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (May 21, 2003), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2003-63.h tm.
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parative analysis also reveals where the allocation of LMLEP
may go astray.
Germany is typically characterized as a late developer in
the process of industrialization. 30 2 As such, it can be said to
have benefited from the experiences of other countries. Yet
this seeming advantage also preempted the experimentation
and flexibility in lawmaking that could be observed in En-
gland.
As in other countries, in Germany the early stages of the
development of securities markets and laws governing corpo-
rations and securities was closely related to railway construc-
tion in the mid-19th century. In 1838, Prussia enacted a law
on railway companies, followed in 1843 by a corporate law.30 3
By upholding the requirement of state approval for the estab-
lishment of companies with limited liability (the concession
system), these laws sought to prevent speculative bubbles of
the kind that England experienced during the railway
mania.30 4 Thus, the lesson of England was to seek control of
the formation of capital markets, not to encourage it. How-
ever, an increasing amount of litigation suggested that the law
was not very effective in preventing company fraud and thus
protecting investors. 30 5 Where fraud did occur, investors had
recourse to general principles of contract or tort law that had
been codified in regional codes (for example in Saxony and
Prussia), or could be derived from the ius commune.306 As else-
302. ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 6-7 (Frederick A. Praeger 1965) (1962). Indeed, the domi-
nance of banks over equity markets in Germany has been explained as the
desire to catch up with the leading industrial power, England, which war-
ranted other strategies to accumulate capital within a much shorter period
of time. Id. at 14. For a critical assessment of the role of banks in early
industrialization in Germany, see, howeverJeremy Edwards & Sheilagh Ogil-
vie, Universal Banks and German Industrialization: A Reappraisal, 49 ECON.
HisT. REV. 427 (1996).
303. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Die Aktiengesellschaft und das Aktienrecht von den
Anfingen bis 1945 [The Corporation and Corporate Law from its Beginnings to
1945], in 1 AKTIENGESETZ GRO3KOMMENTAR [MAJOR COMMENTARY ON THE
GERM-AN STOCK COMPANIES ACT] 13, 16 (KlausJ. Hop & Herbert Wiedemann
eds., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Assmann, Aktienrecht bis 1945].
304. Id. at 30-31.
305. Id. at 39.
306. The ius commune are Roman law principles that were recognized as
the general principles of law throughout the continent and complemented
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where, the law was not very effective in addressing the problem
of misrepresentation of information, albeit for slightly differ-
ent reasons. Judges and legal scholars agreed that the publica-
tion of a prospectus that included wrongful information alone
was not sufficient to establish liability. 307 They reasoned that
the prospectus created only a demonstratio--a general notifica-
tion addressed at potential investors-about securities to fi-
nance a particular undertaking, which should induce investors
to make an offer for buying these securities but was not a bind-
ing offer on the part of the company, much less a binding
agreement. 308
The Lucca-Pistoja case of 1861,309 a landmark series of
cases on misrepresentation of information in prospectuses,
demonstrated the limits of contract and tort law in dealing
with the challenges of securities market development. 310 Simi-
lar to many of the English cases discussed above, -3 1' the undis-
puted facts that can be discerned from the series of lawsuits
that were filed in relation to this incident are as follows: Gold-
schmidt Bank in Frankfurt published an invitation for acquisi-
tion of bonds in a company that was constructing a railway
track from Lucca to Pistoja (Italy).-112 According to the invita-
tion, the operating company had obtained approval from the
government of Tuscany to issue bonds worth 5.25 Million Li-
ras, 3 Million of which had been reserved for underwriting in
Germany.31 3 The offer was immediately oversubscribed.3 14 Af-
ter the company collapsed and it transpired that the prospec-
tus omitted crucial information, investors who had lost their
money sued Goldschmidt Bank." 15
Since the bank itself was not the issuer and had not ac-
quired the bonds in its own name, it could be held responsible
local customs and codifications. See R. C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAw IN
THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 13-14, 24-25 (2002).
307. ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFTUNG, suprm note 144, at 4142.
308. Id. at 45-46.
309. ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFTUNG refers to a series of court decisions aris-
ing from the same fact pattern as the "Lucca-Pistoja" case. See id. at 48.
310. See id.
311. See supra Part IV.A.
312. See ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFrUNC., supra note 144, at 48.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id.
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only as an intermediary. 316  According to the law, in-
termediaries were liable only for intentional wrongdoing. 317
The question courts needed to resolve was whether under the
relevant Roman law doctrine, actio emti, intentional wrongdo-
ing required only the suppression of relevant information, or
also the intent to cheat, which was disputed. 318 German courts
held that liability for fraud required that the offender knew or
reasonably could have known that the information was wrong-
fu1319-not unlike English case law prior to the enactment of
the Directors' Liability Act in 1890. This interpretation was
confirmed by the Reichsgericht in 1886 and upheld in subse-
quent decisions. 320
The existing legal remedies for fraud were put to a new
test when Germany liberalized its corporate law in 1870 and
allowed companies to register freely without a special conces-
sion granted by the state. 321 Shortly after this change, Ger-
many experienced a major boom and subsequent crash (1871-
1873) which resulted in two legislative responses: the tighten-
ing of the corporate code in 1884322 and the enactment of the
Stock Exchange Law (Bdrsengesetz, hereinafter SEL) of 1896.323
In combination, these statutes sought to establish comprehen-
sive control over the process of company formation and listing
on an exchange, as it was in these areas that lawmakers identi-
fied the greatest problems. 324 Unlike English or U.S. legisla-
tion, German lawmakers responded by greatly restricting the
use of the corporate form and imposing legislative restrictions
on access to stock markets. It also placed stock markets
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. RGZ 39, 245 (247).
320. Id.
321. See Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 62, at 810-11.
322. See id.
323. B6rsengesetz [Capital Market Law], v. 22.6.1896 (RGBL S. 157). See
ASSMANN, PROSEKTHAFTUNG, supra note 144, at 61.
324. The dissemination of shares outside these two processes was left un-
regulated by German law. As Max Weber pointed out even prior to the pas-
sage of the 1896 law, this design created incentives to avoid the official ex-
change. See Max Weber, Die Ergebnisse der deutschen B6rsenenquete [ The Results
of the German Stock Exchange Survey], 44 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMMTE
HANDELSRECHT [JOURNAL OF COMPLETE COMMERCIAL LAw] 29, 45 (L. Gold-
schmidt et al. eds., 1896).
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squarely under the supervision of the state.3 25 Thus, Germany
is an example of a legal system that responded to the problem
of under-enforcement by greatly expanding ex ante lawmak-
ing, not by changing the allocation of LMLEP. This Article
suggests that this response, which took the form of a "back-
lash,"3 26 was detrimental to the further development of stock
markets in Germany.
Under the SEL, stock exchanges, of which there were
many scattered throughout the country, were placed under
state control by requirements of regional state licensing.327
The law explicitly delegated important law enforcement pow-
ers to the exchanges. Each stock exchange was required to
establish an admissions office to scrutinize companies prior to
admission to the exchange. 328 The admissions regulations,
however, were drafted by the Upper House of the Parliament,
not the stock exchanges. Thus, the legislature retained
residual lawmaking powers over this crucial area. The fact that
the legislature retained lawmaking rights over this area seems
to have retarded the evolution of listing standards, as the rule
making process in the Upper House proved much more cum-
bersome than comparable processes at the London and New
York stock exchanges.
325. See SUSANNE LOTZ, THE REVIVAL OF THE NATION STATE? STOCK Ex-
CHANGE REGULATION IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZED FINANCIAL MARKETS
11-12 (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper No.
96/9, 1996), available at http://www.mpi.fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg-dp/
dp9-69.pdf.
326. See MarkJ. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1998) (analyzing
the "backlash" that occurs when politics disrupt efficient markets).
327. Historically, exchanges emerged as autonomous bodies. For an over-
view of the history of stock exchanges in Germany, see Hanno Merkt, Zur
Entwicklung des Deutschen B6rsenrechts von den Anfdngen bis zum Zweiten
Finanzmarktf'rderungsgesetz [The Development of the German Stock Ex-
change Law from its Beginnings to the Second Financial Market Promotion
Law], in BoRSENREFORM-EINE OKONOMISCHE, RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE UND
RECHTSPOLITISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG [CAPITAL MARKET REFORM-AN Eco-
NOMIC, COMPARATIVE AND LEGAL POLTCAL ANALSIS] 17 (KlausJ. Hopt et al.
eds., 1997).
328. This office was staffed by the exchanges with representatives from
major banks and large industrial enterprises. HEINZ BREMER, GRUNDZOGE
DES DEUTSCHEN UND AUSLANDISCHEN B6RSENRECHTS [FUNDAMENTALS OF GER-
MAN AND FOREIGN CAPITAL MARKETS] 29 (1969).
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The SEL also included liability rules for misrepresenta-
tion of the prospectus. 329 Responsible parties were defined as
those that published the prospectus or initiated its publica-
tion. 330 In practice, this meant that banks, which acted as the
main company promoters, were the most likely defendants in
liability suits. 331 These provisions proved to be of little practi-
cal relevance. First, they covered only the listing process,
which companies could avoid by issuing shares outside the ex-
change. 33 2 Second, they did not tighten liability requirements,
as the U.K Directors' Liability Act of 1890 had done.3 3 3 Thus,
only intent established liability. 334 The German Supreme
Court did not clarify until 1998 that gross negligence was suffi-
cient. 33 5 Third, the provisions captured only misrepresenta-
tion of information in the prospectus issued for the purpose of
listing a company on the exchange and did not cover the cir-
culation of information for other reasons. 36 Fourth, the de-
fendant could choose to remedy the claim by taking back the
security and refunding the original sale price. 3 37 Giving the
defendant this choice implied that investors who had since
sold the securities on the secondary market had preempted
their ability to bring a lawsuit, as they were unable to return
the security should the defendant choose rescission rather
than compensation. This requirement was justified by the
329. See ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFrUNG, supra note 144, at 61.
330. See id. at 63.
331. See id. at 62.
332. Id.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 215-218.
334. This was in contrast to an earlier draft that had sought to establish
the standard of diligence in one's own affairs (diligentia quam in suis). See
ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFTUNG, supra note 144, at 63.
335. Michael Kort, Neuere Entwicklungen im Recht der B6rsenprospekthafung
(§§ 45ff B6rsG) und der Unternehmensberichtshaftung [Recent Deuelopments in the
Law of Capital Market Prospectus Liability and Corporate Disclosure Liability] (§ 77
BdrsG), 44 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [THE (JOINT) STOCK CORPORATION] 9, 10
(1999).
336. See ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFrUNG, supra note 144, at 62-63.
337. See Borsengesetz [Capital Market Law], v. 22.6.1896 (RGBL S. 157)
Section 44 states that there is no liability for misrepresentation of informa-
tion if the issuer offers to take back the security in exchange for the
purchase price. However, the 1998 revision of the law did away with this
requirement; the law now states that even if the acquirer of the security is no
longer in possession of the paper, the acquirer may request compensation.
On this change in the law, see Kort, supra note 335, at 13.
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need to limit the potential number of claimants and to ensure
some certainty (Rechtssicherheit) for the issuer of a prospec-
tus . ' 8 Finally, there were serious questions as to whether only
the original acquirer of securities or also secondary buyers had
a claim. 339
The German law has remained remarkably stable. Politi-
cal and economic circumstances may not have been very con-
ducive for the development of a vibrant stock market for much
of the 20th century. Still, few attempts were made in the first
decades after WWII to facilitate financial market development
through legal and institutional reforms. The major tool for
regulation of financial markets was the stock exchange law and
the state-sponsored listing requirements. Stock exchanges op-
erated under the supervision of regional governments. A fed-
eral securities regulator, the Bundesaufsichtsamt fir das
Wertpapierwesen [Federal Supervisory Agency for Securities]
(BAW) was established in Germany only in 1994.3 4 o Its origi-
nal enforcement powers were quite limited when compared to
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, or even the En-
glish Financial Services Authority. Prior to the enactment of
the Law on Prospectuses in 1998, 34 1 the lawmaking and law
enforcement powers of the BAW were largely confined to in-
sider trading.342 Under the 1998 law, the BAW can now im-
338. See Kort, supra note 335, at 13. On this requirement of the earlier
laws, see ASSMANN, PROSPEKTHAFtUNG, supra note 144, at 386.
339. See Kort, supra note 335, at 12.
340. See Gesetz fiber den Wertpapierhandel und zur Anderung b6r-
senrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften [Laws Concerning
Securities Exchange and Modifying Capital Markets and Securities Regula-
tions] (Zweites Finanzmarktf6rderungsgesetz [Second Law on Financial
Market Subsidies]), v. 26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1749). On May 1, 2002, BAW was
merged into the Bundesministeriums der Finanzen [Federal Finance Ministry].
See Gesetz fiber die integrierte Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht [Law on the In-
tegrated Supervision of Financial Markets], v. 22.4.2002 (BGBI. I S.1310).
341. Wertpapier-Verkaufsprospektgesetz [Securities Sales Prospectus Law]
(Verkaufsprospektgesetz [Sales Prospectus Law]), v. 9.9.1998 (BGBI. I
S.2701).
342. See Second Law on Financial Market Subsidies, supra note 340. See
a/soJames H. Fries, Jr., An Outsider's Look into the Regulation of Insider Trading
in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 1, 43 (1996) (enumerating the
powers of the BAW). Even with regards to insider trading, the law enforce-
ment powers of the BAW were quite limited. They included monitoring,
such as the right to request additional information from likely violators. In-
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pose fines of up to DM 1 Million on companies for failure to
issue a prospectus or inclusion of fraudulent information in
the prospectus.3 43 However, it cannot bring civil suits against
wrongdoers.3 44 Thus, the law enforcement powers as well as
the scope of lawmaking powers of the BAW have remained
much more limited than those of the SEC in the U.S. or the
FSA in the U.K 3 4 5
C. Summary
This brief overview of financial market regulation in the
U.S. and Germany demonstrates that different legal systems
have allocated residual lawmaking and law enforcement pow-
ers in different ways. In the U.S., the SEC was given extensive
lawmaking and law enforcement powers under the 1933 and
1934 legislation.346 Courts still play an important role in en-
forcing violations of stock fraud laws. In fact, some authors
suggest that the scope of private action has greatly expanded
after the enactment of the SA and the SEA.3 47 Arguably, how-
ever, many potentially harmful actions never make it to the
courts, because they are caught preemptively by a regulator or
are not even attempted because the likelihood of discovery is
sufficiently high.
In contrast, in Germany the legislature long retained
residual lawmaking powers over determining the contents of
listing requirements. 348  Reactive law enforcement by courts
was not very effective because of the difficulties shareholders
vestigations of and punishment for share price manipulations were not part
of its portfolio. See Alfred Kueppers, Germans Look Longingly at SEC Model,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2001, at A15.
343. See Sales Prospectus Law § 17(3).
344. See Sales Prospectus Law. However, § 8(e) authorizes the BAW to
prohibit public offers that do not comply with the Act's requirements. See
also Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offer-
ings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality, and Reciprocity, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 223 n.108 (1999) (noting the powers conferred by
§ 8(e)).
345. For a discussion of the powers of the SEC, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 291-294. For a discussion of the powers of the FSA, see supra text
accompanying notes 258-262.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 291-294.
347. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
304 (5th ed. 2000).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 327-328.
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faced in demonstrating loss, causality, and intent or gross neg-
ligence. 349 The stock exchanges in all jurisdictions examined
developed into the most important proactive law enforcers
prior to the establishment of state regulators, given their
power to refuse listing or to delist companies.3 50 However, by
placing shares outside the exchange, companies could circum-
vent the regulatory reach of the exchange.3 5 1 In fact, in the
post-war era, the unofficial market has played a substantial role
in German financial market development. Law enforcement
for these markets was left to the courts. A remarkable set of
legal cases developed in dealing with misrepresentation of in-
formation-a reminder that the notion that courts' LM pow-
ers are limited in civil jurisdictions does not apply where there
are obvious gaps in statutory law. 352 In light of the problems a
reactive law enforcement regime faces in financial market reg-
ulations, however, the evolving case law could not substitute
for a better regulatory regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article develops the theory of incomplete law and
uses it to analyze the emergence of regulatory functions in fi-
nancial markets and assess the allocation of LMLEP in differ-
ent jurisdictions. It argues that law is intrinsically incomplete:
Because lawmakers are unable to foresee all future contingen-
cies, they cannot write complete law. It further argues that if
law is incomplete, law enforcement that relies exclusively on
deterrence combined with reactive law enforcement will be
sub-optimal. Therefore, other means of lawmaking and law
enforcement are required to achieve optimal law enforce-
ment. This Article suggests that proactive law enforcement
combined with the right to adapt rules flexibly can enhance
349. See supra text accompanying notes 309-320, 334-339.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 240-241 (England), 273-277
(U.S.), 328 (Germany).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 278 (U.S.), 332 (Germany); but see
supra text accompanying note 238 (England).
352. Liability for misrepresentation of information was based on liability
for pre-contractual obligations (culpa in contrahendo), a flexible interpreta-
tion of when a contract was deemed to have been concluded, and the recog-
nition of implied contractual obligations. These judge-made legal principles
were often more stringent than those established by the SEL. See ASSMANN,
PROSPEKTHAF-rUNG, supra note 144, at 21.
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law enforcement. Given that law is incomplete, perfect law en-
forcement is unachievable. The question, therefore, is what
the optimal solution is in a world of only second-best options.
This Article suggests that regulators are agencies vested
with proactive law enforcement and residual lawmaking pow-
ers. It explains the emergence of regulators as a response to
the problem of ineffective enforcement of highly incomplete
law. Regulators perform functions that distinguish them both
from legislatures as lawmakers and from courts as holders of
residual lawmaking and reactive law enforcement powers.
While the scope of their lawmaking rights is limited, they are
more flexible in adapting law over time than legislatures are.
As proactive law enforcers, they can initiate actions and exer-
cise enforcement rights in situations where courts, by design,
must be passive and wait for others to bring action.
The theory is applied to the evolution of financial market
regulation in England. This shows that even in late 19th cen-
tury England, a country with a well-functioning court system
and access to courts for enforcement of investors' rights,
courts as reactive law enforcers faced severe problems in en-
suring effective law enforcement. Over time, regulators in-
creasingly assumed residual lawmaking and proactive law en-
forcement powers. Self-regulatory bodies, such as the stock ex-
changes, spearheaded this development. This evolutionary
process suggests that theories that regard the emergence of
regulation primarily as a result of interest group pressure or
as intervention by an expanding state apparatus fail to explain
the whole story. Developing listing and disclosure require-
ments was the stock exchanges' response to the problem of
under-enforcement against stock frauds, which ultimately
threatened their business of organizing a viable market for
corporate securities. The limits of the exchanges' capacities
help explain why state agents eventually took over. 353 They
can regulate not only official exchanges, but also securities
traded elsewhere. With the growth of unregulated markets,
this became ever more important.
Comparisons with other jurisdictions, including Germany
and the U.S., lend support to this argument. In the U.S., the
New York Stock Exchange also preceded state and federal reg-
353. A detailed analysis of the shift from self-regulation to state regulation
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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ulation. The shift to a federal regulatory regime as early as
1933 is related to the repercussions of the 1929 market crash.
Germany has long focused on regulating exchanges rather
than the market for securities-leaving the latter by default to
case law. Facing challenges of under-enforcement and E.U.
harmonization requirements, a more general regulatory
framework was recently established. The important point is
that analyzing the emergence of financial market regulators
from a theoretical and comparative perspective suggests that
political conditions may determine the timing and scope of
regulatory functions, but that alone they do not explain the
fundamental rationale for their development.
This Article is only the first step in developing and apply-
ing the analytical framework of incomplete law and the corre-
sponding allocation of LMLEP. In order to make its argu-
ments more clearly, it focused on the basic aspects of legal in-
stitutional design, assuming that lawmakers and law enforcers
are benevolent. The next step is to analyze lawmakers' and law
enforcers' incentive problems and political concerns. Differ-
ent ways of allocating LMLEP will have different implications
for lawmakers' and law enforcer's incentive problems. Moreo-
ver, Type I and Type II incomplete law may offer different op-
portunities for corruption, rent seeking, and the like. Factor-
ing in these issues should improve understanding of law en-
forcement and legal institutional design.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
20031
